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Abstract 
Since the financial crisis, Norwegian private consumption has fallen as a share of 
household disposable income. This weak development in consumption was not 
predicted by the contemporaneous consumption models and led to a “structural 
breakdown” of these models.  
 
This thesis will attempt to build a new model for aggregate consumption that is 
better able to explain the developments since the financial crisis. This is done by 
using cointegration analysis to estimate a long run relationship and then include 
this in an error correction model for private consumption. With a basis in the 
current consumption function in Statistic Norway’s KVARTS model, the paper 
demonstrates the breakdown of the incumbent consumption function and conducts 
two separate analyses into possible explanations for the breakdown. 
 
 A first finding is that the income distribution, measured by a Gini coefficient or 
the wage share, does not seem to affect household consumption on the aggregate 
level. In another exercise the wealth variable present in the current model is split 
into different components. In the long run, including net housing wealth and net 
financial wealth separately seems to improve the model. Financial wealth is a 
larger determinant of household consumption in the long run than housing wealth. 
In the short run, the degree of liquidity affects the effect of financial wealth on 
consumption, while controlling for short run dynamics of debt does not improve 
the model. 
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Sammendrag 
Siden finanskrisen har privat konsum falt som andel av husholdningenes disponible 
inntekter. Den svake utviklingen i konsumet kunne ikke forklares av eksisterende 
konsummodeller og ledet til det vi kan kalle et «strukturelt sammenbrudd» for 
disse modellene    
 
I denne analysen forsøker vi å bygge en ny modell for aggregert konsum som er 
bedre i stand til å forklare utviklingen etter finanskrisen. Dette gjøres ved å benytte 
kointegrasjonsanalyse for å tallfeste en langsiktig sammenheng og deretter 
inkludere den i en feiljusteringsmodell for privat konsum. Med utgangspunkt i 
makrokonsumfunksjonen i Statistisk sentralbyrås kvartalsmodell KVARTS viser vi 
først at denne funksjonen bryter sammen og undersøker deretter to mulige 
forklaringer til hvorfor dette skjer.       
 
Et første funn er at inntektsfordelingen, enten den er målt ved en Gini-koeffisient 
eller lønnsandelen i total faktorinntekt, ikke synes å påvirke makrokonsumet. I et 
annet framstøt splitter vi formuesvariabelen som inngår i makrokonsumfunksjonen 
i KVARTS i ulike komponenter. På lang sikt gir et skille mellom netto boligformue 
og netto finansformue, i alle fall tilsynelatende, en forbedring av modellen. 
Finansformuen har større innvirkning på konsumet enn boligformuen. På kort sikt 
har graden av likviditet for den finansielle formuen betydning for konsum-
utviklingen, mens det å kontrollere for kortsiktige effekter av husholdningenes 
gjeld ikke forbedrer modellen. 
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1 Introduction
Since the financial crisis in 2008-2009, the development in household consumption
in Norway has been feeble. The contemporary consumption-models failed in pre-
dicting this development and are not able to explain why Norwegian households
now consume a smaller fraction of their disposable income. Ever since the 1970s,
there has been a stable relationship between consumption, income and wealth that
was able to predict household consumption relatively well up until the financial
crisis. This kind of model was first estimated by Brodin and Nymoen (1992), but
subsequent research has also confirmed this relationship.
Household consumption is one of the most important measures in macroeconomics.
In Norway and most developed countries it represents more than half of GDP. It is
crucial for policymakers to understand the drivers behind aggregate consumption,
both for the government, the central bank and others. This thesis attempts to
build a conditional consumption function that performs better through the finan-
cial crisis and in subsequent years. I will base my model on the existing consump-
tion function from Jansen (2013) that is a part of Statistics Norway’s KVARTS
model.1 There are several possible explanations for the weak development in con-
sumption; increased uncertainty, pension reform, changing demographic, etc., but
no one has yet presented an empirical model that is able to deal with the problem.
When building my consumption model, I have to determine which variables to
include. Disposable income and wealth has already been mentioned as well-known
determinants for consumption. Another factor that has been found and discussed
both in economic theory and in empirical research is that between the real interest
rate and consumption, which I will discuss in detail in the following chapter. Also,
the age-composition of the population is expected to have an eﬀect on consumption
since diﬀerent age groups have diﬀerent incentives to save and consume.
But since these variables have not been adequate in explaining the latest devel-
opments in consumption in Norway, I will attempt to improve the current model
by doing two diﬀerent analyses. The first is to include income distribution as a
variable. This is done on the basis that the marginal propensity to consume is
lower for those with high income, if this holds then we would expect that changes
to the income distribution would aﬀect aggregate consumption. I use two diﬀerent
measures of income inequality, an adjusted version of the Gini coeﬃcient and the
wage share.
1KVARTS is a macroeconomic model for the Norwegian economy used in policy analysis and
predictions about the future developments of the economy.
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My second analysis is to split the wealth variable into several components. I
will look at the eﬀects of diﬀerent wealth components on consumption. These
components are housing wealth, financial wealth and debt. Financial wealth is also
split into three categories according to liquidity. This enables me to investigate if
the degree of liquidity aﬀects the wealth’s eﬀect on consumption. I will also include
debt as a separate variable, thus opening up for the possibility that debt can
have asymmetric eﬀects on consumption. Finally, I propose a new consumption
function, and show that the new model performs better than the old one.
The following chapter presents standard economic theory on consumption in macro-
economics, and comment on the implications of these theories with regards to the
empirical consumption function. Chapter 3 presents the most relevant empirical
work on the consumption function; here I separate the presentation of the interna-
tional and Norwegian research. For Norway the most relevant empirical research
has been conducted after the credit liberalization in the 1980s. Chapter 4 presents
the econometrical methods that I use in the thesis. Here, I first present some of
the most important features of time series analysis, before explaining the concept
of stationarity and cointegration. Finally, in this chapter I explain the relationship
between cointegration and the error correction model (ECM). Chapter 5 briefly
presents the data and the stationarity properties of the series. Then, in chapter
6 I reestimate the old consumption function from Jansen (2013) and show how
this breaks down around 2009, which is the motivation for this thesis. Chapter
7 investigates whether the income distribution might have an eﬀect on aggregate
consumption. My second model, where I split the wealth variable to see if the in-
dividual wealth components have diﬀerent eﬀects on consumption, is documented
in chapter 8. Finally, chapter 9 concludes.
“Consumption — to repeat the obvious — is the sole end and object
of all economic activity.” Keynes (1936)
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2 Theory
Household consumption is one of the most studied macroeconomic variables. It
has been an important part of macroeconomic research for decades and several
theoretical models have been developed to explain it. This chapter will lay the
theoretical foundation for this thesis and go through the most central contribu-
tions. First I explain Keynes’ consumption model, then I move over to intertem-
poral models, beginning with a simple two-period model. Then I present two
well-known intertemporal models; Modigliani et al.’s life cycle hypothesis (LCH)
model and Milton Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis (PIH) model. The
final section shows how some specific assumptions to LCH/PIH implies that con-
sumption should behave as a random walk.
Before I continue, it is necessary to point out the distinction between consumption
in the theoretical models and the empirical consumption variable. The first is
a theoretical, non-observable value, which is the use of services from goods and
services in a given period, while the latter is a measure of the expenditure on goods
and services bought in a given period. The diﬀerence between the two arises when
expenditure and consumption happens in diﬀerent time periods, which is typical
for durable goods that can be consumed over a long time. It is important to be
aware of such diﬀerences when testing the theoretical models empirically.
2.1 Keynes’ consumption model
A discussion of the consumption function is not complete without including Keynes.
In “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money “ from 1936 John
Maynard Keynes made a thorough analysis of household consumption. He divided
the factors that aﬀect consumption into two groups, objective and subjective fac-
tors.
The most important objective factor was income, but Keynes also recognized other
factors as relevant. He discusses the importance of the rate of time discounting,
approximated by the interest rate. The eﬀect of the interest rate, Keynes argues,
is uncertain. He especially discusses the interest rate eﬀect on the valuation of
wealth and therefore on consumption. He also recognizes the importance of the
interest rate in the decision between consumption today or in the future. An-
other factor that he addresses is the eﬀect of fiscal policy; it aﬀects consumption
through disposable income, but also as an instrument for more equal distribu-
tion and therefore aﬀecting aggregate consumption. Keynes recognized that the
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marginal propensity to consume diﬀers between the diﬀerent parts of the income
distribution. Finally, he also discusses saving as a form of investment, and that
households can increase savings if they are met with good investment opportu-
nities. This would lead to consumption being sensitive to changes in investment
returns.
Of the subjective factors, Keynes mentions both psychological and sociological
factors and acknowledged the importance of these, but it is standard to assume
that these factors are fixed in the short term. Keynes mentions both precautionary
saving, people saving more when facing uncertainty, and bequeath, people saving
for the next generation, as examples of subjective factors.
The most popular way to represent Keynes’ theory is to assume that consumption
is a linear function of disposable income.
Ct = a+ b ⇤ Y Dt (2.1)
where Ct is consumption in time t , Y Dt is disposable income at time t, a is the
autonomous consumption, which is consumption independent of income, assumed
to be larger than zero, and b is the marginal propensity to consume (MPC), which
is between zero and one. Implicit in this model is that households are liquidity
constrained, and therefore cannot borrow to consume more than current income
allows.
As we can see from figure 1, the linear relationship between income and consump-
tion held up quite well until around 1985. Around this time we had a liberalization
of the credit markets in Norway, as has been documented by Krogh (2010), this
led to a consumption boom even if income did not see the same increase. Many
other industrialized countries experienced a similar development. It was therefore
obvious that other variables were necessary in an empirical model of household
consumption.
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Figure 1: Private consumption and household disposable income 1975-1990. Nor-
wegian yearly data in billion kroner, fixed 2007-prices.
It is worth to mention that this linear relationship was never proposed by Keynes
and does not capture his full analysis. In fact, more resent research on consumption
is more in line with Keynes’ analysis than equation 2.1, for example with regards
to wealth eﬀects, the interest rate and income inequality.
Keynes’ theories of consumption were very popular up until the 1950s and 1960s,
but several economists refuted the assumption that consumers does not take fu-
ture income into account when deciding how much to consume. Also, empirical
evidence showed that the savings rate was stable even if income was rising, con-
trary to what a proportional relationship between income and consumption would
imply. This led to new theoretical models being developed, especially theories
based on microfoundations as will be presented in the following sections.2
2.2 Intertemporal models
Intertemporal models take into account that consumers maximize utility over their
whole lifetime and therefore that their consumption not only depends on current
2The term microfoundations refers to the microeconomic analysis of the behavior of individ-
ual agents, usually assuming them to behave rationally.
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income, but also current wealth and expected future income. This leads to the
assumption that individuals will “smooth” consumption over their lifetime. They
will borrow when income is low, and save when income is high. For this to be
possible, individuals depend on a well functioning credit market, which is an im-
portant assumption in these models. The two most famous intertemporal models
for consumption is Franco Modigliani’s and his coauthors’ life cycle hypothesis
(LCH) and Milton Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis (PIH).
Compared to Keynes’ simple consumption model, LCH and PIH are richer, in that
they can take several complications into account, like interest rate fluctuations,
altruism, consumers’ time-preferences and uncertainty of future income and of
life-length. But before I present LCH and PIH, I will present a simple two-period
model for consumption. This makes it easier to show the diﬀerent interest rate
eﬀects that appear when households must decide between consumption today or
in the future. In my presentation of the two-period model I follow Sandmo (1968),
while for LCH and PIH, I follow the notation in Doppelhofer (2009).
2.2.1 The two-period model and interest rate eﬀects
First, I introduce the simple case where individuals only have to decide between
consumption over two periods. This simplification is useful to get an intuition
of intertemporal consumption choices, and to explain the diﬀerent interest rate
eﬀects on consumption. We assume that income is exogenous in both periods
and that the individual can borrow or lend money to the same interest rate. The
budget restriction can be written as
c2 = (y1   c1)(1 + r) + y2 (2.2)
Where ct and yt is consumption and income respectively, in time t, and r is the
interest rate. Saving in period one is the diﬀerence between y1 and c1, this can
be both positive and negative. If the saving is positive, there will be more left for
consumption in the second period.
Further, we assume that the individual have preferences over the consumption-
profile which can be represented by a continuous, ordinal utility function which
has a positive first derivative.
U = U(c1, c2) (2.3)
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Then the first order condition to the optimization problem is
U1   (1 + r)U2 = 0 (2.4)
Where Ui =  U ci and since U1/U2 =  (dc2/dc1), for constant U , we can write
 dc2
dc1
= (1 + r) (2.5)
Which states that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in period
1 and 2 (the marginal rate of time preference) is equal to the interest rate.
I now turn to the interest rate eﬀects. The comparative statics will show that the
interest rate eﬀect on consumption in the first period can be separated into an
income and substitution eﬀect. I will express this by using the Slutsky equation,
and show it graphically in figure 2 and 3.
By implicit derivation of equation 2.4 with regards to y gives us
dc1
dy1
= (1 + r)
(1 + r)U22   U12
D
(2.6)
where
D = U11   2(1 + r)U12 + (1 + r)2U22 < 0 (2.7)
which is the second order condition for maximum of the optimization problem.
To determine the sign of the derivative in 2.6 we assume that consumption in both
periods is a normal good, and therefore that 0 <  c1 y1 < 1.
3
Next, we derivate equation 2.4 with respect to the interest rate, r. We then get
 c1
 r
= (y1   c1)(1 + r)U22   U12
D
+
U2
D
(2.8)
Substituting from equation 2.6 yields
 c1
 r
=
1
(1 + r)
(y1   c1) c1
 y1
+
U2
D
(2.9)
3Formally, this is given by (1 + r)U22   U12 < 0 and that U11   (1 + r)U12 < 0, or that the
indiﬀerence curves are convex.
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where the first term on the right-hand side is the income eﬀect, and the last term
is the substitution eﬀect.
We can easily see that the income eﬀect will be negative for a borrower (y1 c1 < 0)
and positive for a lender (y1  c1 > 0). This is natural since a higher interest rate
will lead to higher interest payments for a borrower and therefore lowers disposable
income in the second period. The substitution eﬀect will always be negative, since
an increase in the interest rate will make current consumption relatively more
expensive compared to consumption in period 2. The total eﬀect will therefore
depend on whether the individual is an initial borrower or lender. For the borrower,
both eﬀects will be negative. For the lender the substitution eﬀect will be negative
and the income eﬀect positive, it is therefore not possible to draw any conclusions
about the total eﬀect.
The eﬀect of an increase in the interest rate can for both cases be illustrated graph-
ically in a diagram with consumption in period 1 on the x-axis and consumption
in period 2 on the y-axis. Figure 2 shows the consumption decisions for a lender.
Figure 2: Eﬀects of increased interest rate for lender
The exogenous income (y1, y2) is point I in the diagram. The initial budget con-
straint is the line aa, while the budget constraint with the new interest rate is
given by the line cc. The initial, optimal consumption is given by point A, and
the optimal consumption decision given the new interest rate is at point C. The
change in interest rate gives a steeper budget constraint while still crossing point
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I. The line bb is parallel to the line cc but is tangent to the indiﬀerence curve at
the initial utility level. The change in consumption between point A and B is a
pure substitution eﬀect, while the change from B to C is the income eﬀect. As
we see from the figures, the substitution eﬀect is negative in both cases, while the
income eﬀect has the opposite sign.
Figure 3: Eﬀects of increased interest rate for borrower
In addition to these two eﬀects, we can also talk about a wealth eﬀect of the
interest rate on consumption. This is really a pricing eﬀect, which comes from
the fact that wealth is often priced by discounting future cash flows. When the
interest rate increases, we discount by a higher factor and the value of the wealth
falls. This should, ceteris paribus, lead to lower current consumption.
In an empirical analysis it is diﬃcult to disentangle these interest rate eﬀects or
to know which coeﬃcients that pick up what eﬀect. In my definition of disposable
income I include both income from interest carrying wealth and interest payments
on debt. It is therefore possible that the income eﬀect of changes in the interest
rate is included in the coeﬃcient for disposable income. It is also possible that the
wealth eﬀect of interest rate changes is picked up by the wealth variable.
On average, Norwegian households have held more debt than interest carrying
wealth; therefore the aggregate income eﬀect is expected to be negative. Since the
other eﬀects also should be negative, we expect that the coeﬃcient for the interest
rate in our analysis is negative.
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2.2.2 Life cycle hypothesis (LCH)
The LCH first appeared in Modigliani and Brumberg (1954). Modigliani with
co-authors developed the LCH in the 1950s to describe consumption and saving
behavior of individuals over their lifetime. They argued that consumers were
maximizing their utility over their lifespan subject to a budget constraint, and
therefore smoothed consumption over their lifespan. The optimization problem
can be written as:
MaxU =
PT
t=0
1
(1+⇢)tu(ct), u
0 > 0, u00 < 0
s.t. y1 +
y2
1+r + ...+
yT
(1+r)T 1 + b0(1 + r) =
c1 +
c2
1+r + ...+
cT
(1+r)T 1 +
bT
(1+r)T 1
(2.10)
Where u(ct) is the utility of consuming ct in time t, yt is income in time t, bo is the
initial wealth (e.g. from bequests) and bT are bequests to the next generation, r is
the interest rate and ⇢ is the time preference of consumption. If ⇢ > 0 then one
values consumption today more than later consumption. In the LCH one assumes
that individuals have finite horizons and that they leave behind no assets, this
means that bT is set to zero. We also assume that the utility function is homothetic
w.r.t. consumption in the diﬀerent periods, meaning that the composition of
lifetime consumption will not be sensitive to the size of the lifetime income, in
other words that wealthy individuals smooth their consumption as much as less
wealthy individuals.
The first-order conditions of this problem are u0(ct) = 1+r1+⇢u
0(ct+1), for all t. Thus,
r = ⇢ implies that consumption will be the same in all periods. If r > ⇢, then
c1 < c2 < ... < cT , i.e. consumption will grow over time, and vice versa for r < ⇢.
The results from the LCH can be aggregated to make predictions for aggregate
consumption. According to the LCH, individuals would borrow before entering
the labor market, accumulate savings while working, and then dissave after retire-
ment. It also implies that consumption will respond little to temporary changes
in income, but that unexpected, permanent changes to income would lead to an
proportional change in consumption.
Another implication is that the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of
current income depends on age. This means that the age-composition of the
population will have an eﬀect on aggregate consumption. A country with high
population growth will have a higher aggregate savings rate because of the relative
larger share of workers. Also, an economy with economic growth will have dissavers
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living on assets accumulated out of lower incomes than current workers are earning.
On the face of it, this should result in a higher aggregate saving rate. However,
higher expected real per capita income growth will, if borrowing is possible for
the young, result in higher consumption for them which could oﬀset (for very
high growth rates) the higher saving rate of the working population. In practice
however, there are credit constraints that limit consumption for the young.
Figure 4: Illustration of Modigliani et al.’s life cycle hypothesis model.
Empirically, several of the assumptions behind LCH do not hold quite so well.
First, young individuals consume too little compared to their expected lifetime
income and have a large propensity to consume. This might be due to myopia,
or credit constraints that are mostly due to the lack of collateral. Also, consump-
tion seems to vary over the working life, which is not what we would expect from
consumption smoothing. Reasons for this could be precautionary saving and de-
mographic changes in families; households consume more when they have children.
Finally, data also tells us that individuals consume too little after retirement. This
could also be explained by precautionary saving because people do not know how
long they will live, another factor could be presence of bequests (bT > 0) (Dop-
pelhofer, 2009).
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2.2.3 Permanent income hypothesis (PIH)
Milton Friedman’s PIH is similar to the LCH, but with an infinite time horizon.
This is similar to saying that individuals value the consumption of later generations
as well as their own consumption. We simplify by assuming that each generation
live for one period and that they care about the utility of the next generation:
t = 1 : U1 = u(c1) +  U2
t = 2 : U2 = u(c2) +  U3
. . .
where Ut stands for the total utility for the generation born in period t, while
u represents the utility of own consumption. Since the total utility of the gener-
ation born in t = 1 also depends on the utility of the generation born in t = 2,
which depends on the utility of generation born in t = 3, we can write the total
utility of the first generation as:
u(c1) +  u(c2) +  
2u(c3) + ... =
1X
t=1
 t 1u(ct) (2.11)
Since individuals value the consumption of later generations, they will act as if
they had an infinite horizon for their consumption choices, with   as the discount
factor for future consumption.4 Comparing this to the LCH, the diﬀerence is that
  = 11+⇢ , and that the time horizon is infinite for the PIH.
Again, we assume the individual maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint,
which in this case is:
1X
t=1
yt
(1 + r)t 1
+ b0(1 + r) =
1X
t=1
ct
(1 + r)t 1
+ lim
T!1
bT
(1 + r)T 1
(2.12)
On the left hand side we have the present value of total income, plus initial assets
over the infinite horizon. This must be equal to the present value of all consump-
tion, plus the present value of wealth as time goes towards infinity.
Where we for the LCH-model assumed that bT was zero, we now impose the con-
dition that limT!1 bT(1+r)T 1   0 which means that the present value of assets must
4Some have argued that it is immoral to discount the consumption of future generations,
and that therefore the only morally right number of   is one.
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be non-negative and that potential debt must not grow faster than the interest
rate.5 The consequences of this restriction is that consumers cannot finance infi-
nite consumption by borrowing ever increasing amounts. We can also argue that
it will not be optimal for consumers to accumulate savings at a faster rate than
the interest rate, we would then have that the present value of savings would be
unbounded. Therefore, the optimal consumption path must satisfy the so-called
transversality condition
lim
T!1
bT
(1 + r)T 1
= 0 (2.13)
We can then simplify the budget constraint to
1X
t=1
yt
(1 + r)t 1
+ b0(1 + r) =
1X
t=1
ct
(1 + r)t 1
(2.14)
Solving this optimization problem of maximizing utility from equation 2.11 subject
to the budget constraint in equation 2.14, gives us the Euler equation6
u0(ct) = (1 + r) u0(ct+1) (2.15)
Since,   is the discount factor for future consumption, the result is equal to that of
the LCH (only now we talk about discount between generations instead of “own”
consumption). If we consider the special case of   = 11+r , then we get that
u0(ct) = u0(ct+1) (2.16)
which implies that consumption should be constant over time, ct = ct+1 = c¯. If
we substitute this in the budget constraint and solve, we get
1X
t=1
c¯
(1 + r)t 1
=
1X
t=1
yt
(1 + r)t 1
+ b0(1 + r) (2.17)
which states that in each period, individuals will consume the annuity value of the
total wealth, Milton Friedman (1957) called this annuity the permanent income,
yP .7
5This is also called the non-ponzi scheme condition.
6An Euler equation is a diﬀerence or diﬀerential equation that is an intertemporal first-order
condition for a dynamic choice problem.
7In deriving equation 2.18 we use
P1
t=1 1/(1 + r)
t 1 = (1 + r)/r.
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ct = y
P
t ⌘
r
1 + r
 1X
s=0
yt+s
(1 + r)s
+ bt 1(1 + r)
!
(2.18)
This shows us that consumption should respond proportionally to permanent in-
creases in income, but almost not at all to temporary changes. In this way, the
PIH can explain why we over shorter periods can observe changes in the marginal
propensity to consume (MPC) out of current income, while over longer time peri-
ods MPC is relatively stable.
2.3 Consumption as a random walk
As shown above, the assumptions we make have implications for what predic-
tions we can draw from the theories. One popular set of assumptions, made by
Hall (1978), gives us the (perhaps surprising) result that current consumption is
independent from current income, and that consumption follows a random walk.
If we begin by introducing uncertainty over future income, this means that indi-
viduals maximize the utility function
max
c1,c2,...
E1
( 1X
t=1
 t 1u(ct)
)
(2.19)
here E1 indicates the expectations conditional on all the information known at
time t = 1. The budget constraint is still given from equation 2.14. In the budget
constraint it is the present value of realized consumption that must be equal to the
realized total wealth. Solving this stochastic version of the PIH, we get that the
marginal utility of consumption in period should equal the expected discounted
marginal utility in period 2
u0(c1) = (1 + r) E1 [u0(c2)] (2.20)
Now Hall (1978) makes two simplifying assumptions. The first is that we assume
a quadratic utility function
u(c) = c  ac2/2 (2.21)
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where a is bigger than zero. Then the marginal utility will be u0(c) = 1 ac, which
is linear in consumption. This has the eﬀect that the individual exhibits certainty
equivalence in his consumption decision, which means that any individual will act
as if future consumption is at its conditional mean value and ignore its variation.
The second assumption is that 1 + r = 1/ . This ensures that consumers want
to hold marginal utility (and consumption) constant over time. This is the same
assumption as we used under the discussion of LCH.
Given these two assumptions the stochastic Euler equation becomes
c1 = E1(c2) (2.22)
Or conversely that ct = ct 1 + ✏t, which is a standard random walk. That con-
sumption follows a random walk derives from the fact that rational individuals use
all information available at time t = 1 to smooth consumption so that only new,
unforeseen information about income will impact the consumption level. Another
implication is that changes in consumption are unpredictable. Hall (1978) argued
that this was an approximation that holds if the market interest rates and the
subjective discount rate are not far apart, and if consumption shocks are small
relative to the level of consumption.
Hall (1978) tests this theory on postwar aggregate data from the US and he con-
cludes that past levels of consumption and income have no predictive power for
future consumption, which is in line with his predictions. However, he does find
that lagged levels of the S&P stock market prices are significant in predicting ag-
gregate consumption. Since then, researchers have not been able to find strong
evidence for Hall’s model, and even if it did fit the data well, it does not help in
explaining the changes in consumption over time.
Even though there is much evidence that consumption can, in fact, be predictable
by using lagged variables of consumption, income and wealth, and that such pre-
dictions are better than the simple random walk model, many researchers still use
the Euler equation approach when modeling consumption. Especially in academia
and among central banks, the most common way to model the economy is through
DSGE-models that have sound theoretical foundation from microeconomics and
that are fairly small models that do not require much data.8 This is in contrast
to building econometric models that can explain the data well, but with a looser
8Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models are macroeconomic models that are derived
from microeconomic principles, often based on rational individuals.
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connection to theory. Researchers are still divided on this issue, but empirical
evidence seems to support econometric models, both with regards to forecasting
and being able to explain developments in consumption.
This concludes the chapter presenting economic theory about private consump-
tion. As we have seen throughout this chapter, there are many diﬀerent factors
in the economy that eventually aﬀect aggregate consumption. It is impossible to
incorporate all these factors in an econometric model, but the goal is to build a
model that is able to explain the main developments in consumption.
The following chapter will present the current empirical literature on the consump-
tion function both internationally and for Norway I then continue with introducing
the empirical methods used in the analysis in this thesis, before I shift focus to
my own analysis beginning with presenting the data in chapter 5.
22
3 Literature review
In this chapter I present the most central empirical work on the consumption
function. As the diﬀerent theories of consumption developed over time, so has
the empirical research. Up until the 1980s the common way to model aggregate
consumption was by Keynes’ consumption model, where current income was the
main explanatory variable. But these models were unable to explain the develop-
ments following the liberalization of credit markets in many industrialized coun-
tries during the 1980s, which led to new conditional consumption models usually
including some form of wealth. In Norway, consumption models including income
and wealth had much success up until 2008, but since then they have been unable
to explain the low level of consumption that has persisted since the financial cri-
sis, and researchers have been unable to find satisfactory answers to why this has
happened.
I begin with a brief overview of some the most important international research and
then move over to the Norwegian consumption function. I focus on the empirical
work on conditional consumption functions from the 1980s up until today.
3.1 International research
Given the importance of consumption in macroeconomics, it has been one of the
most studied of the aggregate expenditure relationships and a central part of
all macroeconomic model building. One of the first attempts of such modeling
was Klein and Goldberger (1955). Following Keynes, they built a econometric
model for the American economy where the consumption function was relatively
simple. They included diﬀerent forms of income, liquid assets and the population
as explanatory variables. There were a lot of problems facing the early empirical
work on the consumption function. Statistical problems of working with non-
stationary time series were not really understood and data were not as readily
available, especially for households’ assets.
1978 was an important year for empirical research on consumption. Two papers
were published that had diﬀerent approaches on modeling consumption. The
first was Hall (1978) who argued for modeling consumption by Euler-equations
as explained in section 2.3. The second was the study by Davidson et al. (1978)
(DSHY) who were one of the first to use an error correction model (ECM) to
find a robust empirical relationship between income and consumption. DSHY
managed to find a long run relationship between income and consumption, which
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also satisfied economic theory. The use of ECM gained further popularity when
Engle and Granger (1987) found that cointegrated relationships can be represented
by an ECM, the so-called Granger representation theorem. ECM and cointegration
is explained in chapter 4.
The most popular way to model aggregate consumption up until the 1980s was
according to Keynes’ consumption model from section 2.1. These were simple
models where income was the main explanatory variable. In the 1980s some re-
searchers claimed that “the consumption function has faded as a topic of intense
research because of the success of previous research in achieving a workable con-
sensus” (Darby, 1987 in the New Palgrave, found in Muellbauer and Lattimore
(1995)). However, researchers at the time were not aware that their models were
in the process of breaking down. Up until the 1980s income and wealth had moved
mostly in tandem, it was therefore diﬃcult to empirically find a significant eﬀect
of wealth on consumption when already including income. But the liberalization
of credit markets made it easier for households to borrow money using wealth as
collateral which altered the relationship between income, consumption and wealth.
The failure of the existing models in explaining the fall in the savings rate in the
mid-1980s, both in the US and in other industrial countries, reinvigorated the
empirical research on the consumption function. The solution was often to in-
clude some form of wealth in the models. This is also consistent with the broad
implications of the life cycle hypothesis and the permanent income hypothesis
(Muellbauer and Lattimore, 1995).
Since then a lot of research has found support for a long run relationship between
consumption, income and wealth. It is generally accepted that the three vari-
ables are cointegrated, and that there exists only one long run relationship. Using
the Granger representation theorem (Engle and Granger, 1987) one can therefore
model consumption with a error correction model. However, which variable that
equilibrium corrects, i.e. the variable that adjusts to reach equilibrium, is dis-
puted. Lettau and Ludvigson (2001, 2004) find support for cointegration and that
wealth is the variable that equilibrium corrects, using data from the US, while
Hamburg et al. (2008) find, using German data, that income equilibrium corrects.
To make the uncertainty complete, Barrell and Davis (2007) argue that consump-
tion is the variable that equilibrium corrects. If consumption equilibrium corrects
then we have empirical support for the conditional consumption function. Barrell
and Davis (2007) also investigate the eﬀect of liberalization of credit markets on
consumption in seven OECD countries, and find, in five out of seven countries,
that the liberalization leads to bigger wealth eﬀects on consumption, and lower
consumption out of current income.
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Davis (2010) gives a survey on the studies done on wealth eﬀects on consumption
for several countries. He states that there are eﬀects on consumption of tangible
wealth as well as financial wealth. There is reason to believe that the eﬀects of
housing wealth on consumption diﬀers more across countries than that of financial
wealth given that there are large diﬀerences in housing finance systems. He also
notes that the eﬀects, both long and short run, seem to vary across countries.
While it is reasonable that the short-run eﬀects diﬀer because of diﬀerent culture,
financial systems etc., some argue that the long-run eﬀects should be the same
for all countries like Labhard et al. (2005), but Davis (2010) concludes that the
empirical evidence does not support this.
Davis (2010) also discusses disaggregation of the wealth variable. He notes that the
diﬀerent characteristics of financial wealth, notably liquidity, may impact its eﬀect
on consumption. Byrne and Davis (2003) analyzed the impact of disaggregated
net financial wealth on consumption for the G7 countries. They found that illiquid
financial wealth (equities, bonds, life insurance and pension assets less mortgage
debt) was a more significant long run determinant of consumption than liquid
financial wealth. This may be because liquid financial wealth is not held as a long
term store of value, but rather as a means of transactions.
There has also been research on the eﬀect of tangible wealth on consumption,
mostly housing wealth. Higher house prices may give more room for household
consumption, but it can be argued that there is a negative eﬀect of higher house
prices on consumption through the increase in opportunity cost of housing services
(Buiter, 2008). We could also have that the benefits of higher house prices to
incumbents is oﬀset by costs to new entrants and higher rental prices for tenants
(Aoki et al., 2004). Another factor is that housing, unlike financial wealth, may
be held as an end in and of itself Case et al. (2005). These views were influential
in the period 2000-2007, but after the financial crisis there has been more focus
on the role of housing wealth on consumption (Davis, 2010).
3.1.1 Consumption function based on Euler equations
Since Hall (1978) there has also been much research on Euler-equations. Empirical
research has shown that consumption is predictable in practice, using lagged vari-
ables of income, consumption or wealth. The Euler-equation approach has given
worse results than the conditional consumption function when it comes to ana-
lyzing and predicting consumption, also the Euler equation-approach gives little
insight to what drives consumption (Jansen, 2013). As Muellbauer and Lattimore
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(1995) pointed out, the Euler equations leaves out long run information on the
relationship between assets, income and consumption, and may also suﬀer worse
aggregation problems than “solved out” equations incorporating lags. Still, models
based on Euler equations remain popular among several researchers, which might
be because of the theoretical foundation, or because such models are smaller and
require less data.
3.2 The Norwegian consumption function
As in the rest of the world, the norm in Norway was for a long time to include
income as the only explanatory variable in the consumption function. And as
in many other countries, these models broke down after the deregulation of the
credit markets and the following consumption-boom in 1985-87, they failed both
in forecasting and to explain the data ex post. The failure of these models is
documented in Eitrheim et al. (2002).
This led Brodin and Nymoen (1992) to include wealth in their model. Earlier
attempts of including wealth had been made by using the tax value of houses,
however these have several weaknesses. The tax value is usually very low compared
to the market value and do not always follow the changes in the market value which
is the relevant value for households. Due to the lack of good time series on wealth
Brodin and Nymoen (1992) constructed their own wealth variable defined as
Wt = (Lt 1   CRt 1 + (PH/PC)t ⇤Kt 1) (3.1)
Where Lt is household sector liquid assets, CRt is household sector loans by banks
and financial institutions, PHt is housing prices, PCt is private consumption ex-
penditure deflator, andKt is the volume of the residential housing stock. Therefore
the wealth variable is net financial wealth plus wealth in housing, where wealth
in housing is defined as the housing prices multiplied with the volume of the resi-
dential stock. Brodin and Nymoen (1992) conducted a cointegration analysis, and
found the long run relationship
c = constant+ 0.56y + 0.27w (3.2)
Where total consumption (c) is in a long-run relationship with household real dis-
posable income (y) and household real wealth (w). Here, small letters indicate
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that the variables are log-transformed. Brodin and Nymoen (1992) also tested for
weak exogeneity, and found that income and wealth were weakly exogenous with
respect to the long run coeﬃcient (see section 4.3.2 for explanation of weak exo-
geneity). This means that consumption is the variable that equilibrium corrects.
They also found structural breaks in the processes of the conditioning variables
as well as a stable conditional model. This points to income and wealth being
super-exogenous, which refutes the Lucas-critique.9
After the article from Brodin and Nymoen (1992), Jansen (1992) commented that
the parameters from Brodin and Nymoen’s model were stable also outside the orig-
inal sample, and that the model forecasted well out of sample. Magnussen and
Moum (1992) answered Jansen by arguing that the model was flawed, especially
since it did not have a sound theoretical foundation. They argued that the dereg-
ulation of the credit market in 1985 represented a structural break which should
be included in the consumption function. They rejected the assumption that the
parameters could be stable before and after the deregulation because the increased
access to credit should have changed consumers preferences. They also argued for
including the real, after-tax interest rate as a variable that should have an eﬀect
after the deregulation, and that the lack of homogeneity in income and wealth
was a weakness, as this rules out a steady-state growth where consumption, in-
come and wealth grows proportionally over time. The most central criticism from
Magnussen and Moum (1992) was however, that the wealth-variable, and espe-
cially the house prices included in Brodin and Nymoen (1992), did not reflect the
actual prices relevant for consumers. Magnussen and Moum (1992) showed that
other house price indices moves diﬀerently in the period between 1980-87. They
used house prices from “Norsk Byggforskningsinstitutt” (“Norwegian Building Re-
search”) which includes prices from housing cooperatives and has a less dramatic
price increase around the time of the deregulation. They showed, using this house
price index, that Brodin and Nymoen’s model breaks down in the period right
after deregulation.
After this discussion, further research were split into two schools; one following
Brodin and Nymoen’s example, the other using Magnussen and Moum’s strategy
with a structural break in 1985. Table 1 summarizes the most relevant research
since 1992. The table is from Jansen (2009), and I have added the results from
Jansen (2013).
9The Lucas critique is a common critique of econometric policy evaluation procedures that
points to the failure to recognize that optimal decision rules of economic agents vary systemati-
cally with changes in policy.
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Paper Sample Consumption-
variable
Wealth-
variable
House-
price*
Income
elasticity
Wealth
elasticity
Semi-
elasticity
real
interest
Semi-
elasticity
age
Adjust-
ment-
speed
Brodin
and
Nymoen
(1992)
1968(3)-
1989(4)
Total con-
sumption
Houses and
liquid
wealth, BN
0.56 (0.03) 0.27 (0.02) -0.71
(0.08)
Ekeli
(1992)
1976(4)-
1991(4)
Total con-
sumption
Total
wealth, BN
0.63 t-
value=2.1
0.27 t-
value=3.2
-0.96
t-value
=11.1
Brubakk
(1994)
1968(2)-
1991(4)
Consumption
of non-
durable
goods
Total
wealth,
MM
0.59 t-
value=5.0
0.13*** -0.49
t-value
=5.7
Frøiland
(1999)
1967(3)-
1997(3)
cpeb** Total
wealth,
MM
0.58*** 0.21*** -0.71***
Eitrheim
et. al.
(2002)
1968(3)-
1998(4)
Total con-
sumption
Total
wealth, BN
0.65 (0.17) 0.23 (0.07) -0.34
(0.08)
Erlandsen
and
Nymoen
(2008)
1968(3)-
2004(4)
Total con-
sumption
per capita
Total
wealth, BN
0.65 (0.03) 0.17 (0.02) -0.42
(0.19)
-0.31
(0.08)
-0.47
(0.07)
Jansen
(2012)
1971(1)-
2008(4)
cpeb* Total
wealth, BN
0.85 (-) 0.15 (0.02) -0.71
(0.22)
-0.38
(0.08)
*BN indicates that the model uses the house price index from Brodin and Nymoen, while
MM indicates the house price index from Magnussen and Moum.
**Consumption less expenditure on health services and on housing.
***Value after shift in 1985. Sum of two coeﬃcients where both are significant.
Standard deviations in parenthesis.
Table 1: Estimated long run coeﬃcients for the Norwegian consumption function.
Ekeli (1992) builds on the research of Brodin and Nymoen (1992) but uses an wider
wealth variable that includes wealth components like stocks and bonds. This had
little eﬀect on the estimated coeﬃcients. Brubakk (1994) estimates the model
with the house prices from Magnussen and Moum (1992) and includes a dummy
variable to control for the deregulation of the credit market. His estimated wealth
elasticity is less than half of that of Brodin and Nymoen (1992). He also excludes
the consumption of durable goods from his analysis. Frøiland (1999) builds on
Brubakk (1994), but uses total consumption less health spending and services
from housing. Arguing that consumption of services from housing is determined
in a large part from house prices and that health spending is more determined
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by government policy, and that these two are not consumption choices made by
households.
Erlandsen and Nymoen (2008) includes an age variable as well as a variable for the
real interest rate. They find that when controlling for the age composition, defined
as the relative size of the age group between 50-66 years, the real interest rate also
becomes significant.10 Erlandsen and Nymoen finds a negative coeﬃcient for the
age variable, which implies that as the age group between 50-66 years increases,
this leads to lower consumption. They also estimate consumption per capita, but
this should not make a diﬀerence, since all the series divided on a per capita basis
should not change the coeﬃcients.
Jansen (2013) reestimate the consumption function with the wealth variable from
Brodin and Nymoen (1992) and with the real interest rate as a exogenous variable.
He finds an income elasticity of 0.85, elasticity on wealth of 0.15 and semi-elasticity
of the interest rate of -0.71 on data from the first quarter in 1971 to the last quar-
ter of 2008. We note that the income elasticity is higher than any of the previous
models, and the results also diﬀer from earlier research in that the homogeneity
restriction is not rejected. Jansen (2013) also finds that the conditional consump-
tion function forecasts better than two alternative Euler equations in the period
between 2006 and 2008. The first Euler equation models consumption as a random
walk, the other includes the real interest rate.
3.2.1 Research after the financial crisis
The relationship between consumption, income and wealth changed after 2008.
Consumption growth weakened substantially and the consumption models at the
time failed to predict this. Andersen et al. (2016) finds that consumption as a share
of current income has fallen four percentage points since 2009. Several researchers
have tried to find an explanation for this development, without finding satisfactory
results. Figure 5 shows how the correlation between the consumption to income
ratio and the wealth to income ratio has changed from a positive correlation up
until 2008 and a negative relationship after 2008. The figure directly shows the
cointegration between consumption, income and wealth up until 2008.
10Erlandsen and Nymoen (2008) and Jansen (2013) set the real interest rate to zero before
quarter 1 in 1984, arguing that it is not relevant before the credit liberalization.
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Figure 5: The log of the consumption to income ratio and the log of the wealth
to income ratio, both in moving average with 2 lags and 1 lead, in the period
1970-2015.
Gudmundsson and Natvik (2012) investigates the eﬀect of uncertainty on con-
sumption and finds that increasing uncertainty can be one of the reasons of the
changed behavior. Using micro data, Fagereng and Halvorsen (2016) finds evi-
dence that households with higher debt has a lower consumption growth. They
find that “much of the leveling oﬀ in consumption growth after the crisis reflects a
regular response by highly indebted households.” (Fagereng and Halvorsen, 2016),
but they add that precautionary saving probably also played a role.
Jansen (2015) lists several potential reasons for why the fall in the consumption
rate, such as the pension reform of 2011, increased immigration, stricter require-
ments for borrowers, demographic changes in the population, increased saving
incentive for youth through “BSU”-accounts, increased immigration, and changes
to the income distribution.11 Andersen et al. (2016) investigates empirically some
of these potential reasons, and find that stricter credit conditions and increased
uncertainty has been the biggest contributors to the weak development.
Another factor could be the increased house prices. On one side higher house
11BSU-accounts are savings accounts with tax-incentives and high interest rates for young
people to save towards buying a house. These accounts give young people a large incentive to
save.
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prices increases housing wealth for house owners, on the other side it makes it
increasingly harder for other people to aﬀord a house. This might force people to
increase their saving towards buying a house. Higher housing prices might also
increase consumption of housing services; this could lead to a “crowding out” of
other consumption.
As this and the previous chapter shows, there can be many potential variables
aﬀecting consumption. In my further analysis I focus on two areas; income
distribution- and wealth eﬀects. I attempt to build a model that can help ex-
plain the current movements in consumption, while still being consistent with
economic theory and with the historical data. My starting point is the model
from Jansen (2013). I replicate this model and show the break-down of the model
in the financial crisis in chapter 6. Chapter 7 looks at whether the distribution of
income in the population could have an eﬀect on household consumption, while
chapter 8 look at the diﬀerent wealth components. The data used in the analysis
is presented in chapter 5, but first I need to introduce the empirical methods, this
is done in the following chapter.
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4 Method
This chapter gives a brief introduction to time series analysis and the method-
ologies that are used in my analysis. This includes some basic time series econo-
metrics, cointegration analysis and the equilibrium correction model. The goal is
to build a model that can explain the observed variation in Norwegian household
consumption and that can be used to forecast consumption in the close future. In
my analysis I have used the econometric software OxMetrics developed by Jurgen
Doornik and David Hendry, and especially the module PcGive.
In this thesis I use an estimation technique known as general to specific (GETS)
modeling. In short, this involves beginning with a large model with many vari-
ables and lags (the general model) and then using statistical tests and information
criteria when trying to simplify the model. GETS modeling is explained in more
detail in section A.3 of the appendix, while a presentation of information criteria
is given in section A.4.
I begin with a discussion on time series econometrics and some of the assumptions
that need to be fulfilled for our model to be valid. Section 4.2 explains the notion
of stationarity of time series. One way of dealing with non-stationary time series
is finding cointegrated relationships, which is discussed in section 4.3. Finally I
present the equilibrium correction model in section 4.3.1.
The methods presented in this chapter are well known statistical and econometric
concepts found in most text books about econometrics and time series, examples
are Wooldridge (2015) and Enders (2008). The topics in section 4.3 are thoroughly
presented in Bårdsen and Nymoen (2014).
4.1 Time series analysis
A time series is a sequence of data points that are observations measured in a
chronological order. Most data relevant in macroeconomics are time series. To be
able to do estimation and inference for time series regressions we need to make
many of the same assumptions as for cross-sectional data. These include that the
series must be linear in parameters (yt =  0+ 1xt1+ 2xt2+ ...+ kxtk+ut), where
xti can be lagged observations of yt or some other variable, that we must have zero
conditional mean (E(ut | xt1, ..., xtk) = E(ut | xt) = 0) and that there is no perfect
collinearity between variables. All these are necessary to be able to get consistent
estimators. Further, we also must assume homoscedasticity and that there is no
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autocorrelation, two assumptions I dig deeper into in the following subsections. If
we also add the assumption that ut is independent of x, and that ut ⇠ N(0,  2),
i.e. normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation of  2, then we
can use the standard ordinary least squares also for time series.
When doing an econometric analysis with several variables there is always the
possibility of potential feedback eﬀects between the variables. This is especially
the case when working with economic series. When these feedback-eﬀects exists,
we can use a vector autoregressive (VAR) model. As the name suggests, a VAR
model “stacks” the variables in vectors and we can then treat several variables as
endogenous.
4.1.1 Homoscedasticity
Homoscedasticity is that the variance of the residuals are independent of the ex-
planatory variables and of time, i.e. that the conditional variance is constant.
This is the opposite of heteroscedasticity, where the conditional variance changes
over time. Formally, homoscedasticity can be written as
V ar(ui | x1, x2, ..., xk) =  2 (4.1)
Where ui is the residuals, x1, x2, ..., xk are the explanatory variables, and   is a
constant.
Heteroscedasticity does not lead to biased estimators, but makes the variance
formulas invalid and therefore aﬀects the statistical inference. This means that
the standard errors, t-statistics or F-statistics are invalid under the presence of
heteroscedasticity.
There are several ways to test for heteroscedasticity. A simple way to investigate
this is to plot the residuals to look for patterns. The most well known formal tests
to discover heteroscedasticity are the Breusch-Pagan test and the White test. In
my analysis OxMetrics will automatically report test statistics and p-values for
heteroscedasticity-tests, and since I do multivariate regressions OxMetrics reports
results for vector-tests.12
Often in time series, it is possible that the conditional variance itself follows an
autoregressive pattern. It is then possible to model the volatility with so-called
12Explanations for the diﬀerent vector tests implemented in OxMetrics is given in Doornik
and Hendry (2013b).
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ARCH- or GARCH models, however, I do not attempt to model volatility in this
thesis.13
4.1.2 Autocorrelation
Autocorrelation in the residuals is that we have correlation between residuals in
diﬀerent points in time. Conversely, when we assume that there is no autocorre-
lation in the residuals, then ut and ut i should be independent for all i 6= 0. One
way of possibly reducing the problem of autocorrelation is by adding lags to the
model. We can detect autocorrelation graphically by plotting the residual in time
t against the residual from the previous period, or we can conduct statistical tests.
OxMetrics report test statistic an p-value for both the vector Portmanteau test
and ARCH 1-4 test as tests for autocorrelation.
4.2 Stationarity
A time series is said to be stationary if it has constant mean and variance, and
if the covariance between two observations depends only on the distance between
them and not at what point we measure them (that they are time invariant).
When doing time series analysis it is very important to be aware of the stationar-
ity properties of the series we are working with. Doing regressions without dealing
with stationarity can lead us to make false conclusions as we risk doing spuri-
ous regressions. More formally we can say that a stochastic process {yt}1t= 1 is
(covariance) stationary if, for all t:
E(yt) = µ
V ar(yt) = E(yt   E(yt))2 = E(yt   µ)2 =  2
Cov(yt, yt s) = E [(yt   E(yt))(yt s   E(yt s))]
= E [(yt   µ)(yt s   µ)] =  s for all s 6= 0
(4.2)
Where µ and  2 are constants, and  s depends only on s.14
13ARCH (autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity) or GARCH (general ARCH) are mod-
els that attempt to model the volatility of a series. This depends on volatility following a au-
toregressive pattern.
14Here, I follow the notation from lectures in the course “Time series analysis and prediction”
with lecturer Yushu Li.
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One example of a process that is non-stationary is a random walk. A simple
random walk can be written as yt = yt 1 + ✏t, where ✏t is white noise.15 We then
see that the first diﬀerence of yt,  yt, will be stationary. It is often the case that
a non-stationary series can become stationary when diﬀerencing. And generally
we say that a process is integrated of order d when it is made stationary by taking
the diﬀerence d times, this is denoted as
yt ⇠ I(d)()  dyt ⇠ I(0) (4.3)
Where I(0) indicates a stationary series. In this thesis I only work with series that
are I(0) or I(1). There are large diﬀerences in how a stationary and non-stationary
series behave. For a stationary series with the characteristics listed above, a shock
will only have a temporary eﬀect on the series, i.e. that the autocorrelations will
gradually decrease over time. For an I(1) series, the variance will go towards
infinity as time goes to infinity, also the eﬀect of a random shock will have a
permanent eﬀect on the series and the autocorrelations will stay close to 1, i.e.
that each observation depends strongly on the previous observation, or that the
series has long memory. Therefore, things that cause a discrete change in yt can
have long-lasting eﬀects. An I(1) series is often said to contain a unit root.
Since an I(1) series will have a variance that goes towards infinity, while a I(0) has
finite variance, it will always be true that the sum (or any linear combination) of
an I(1) and an I(0) will be an I(1) series. Generally, we can also say that if
xt and yt are both I(d), then usually, the linear combination ✏t = xt   ayt, will
also be I(d). In special cases however, we might get that ✏t ⇠ I(d   b), b > 0.
Which means that it is possible for a linear combination of two I(1) series to be
I(0). When this is the case, it is said that the series are cointegrated (Engle and
Granger, 1987). Cointegration is a central part of this paper, and something I will
explain in more detail in section 4.3.
It is easy to understand the importance of being aware of what kind of series one
works with, in the following subsection I will therefore go through how to test for
unit-roots.
4.2.1 Unit root tests
There are several ways to tests if the series are stationary. I will use the most
popular test called the Dickey-Fuller test. The starting point for the test is the
15A white noise process is a stationary stochastic process with mean zero, constant variance
and cov(✏t, ✏t s) = 0 for all s.
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general AR(1) model for the time series yt
yt =  yt 1 + ✏t (4.4)
Where ✏t is a random disturbance with zero mean and constant variance  2✏ . If
  = 1 then the series is a random walk, and it is said to have a unit root. By
looking at the variance of such a process, we can show that it is non-stationary.
If we assume   = 1 and that y0 = 0, then, by repeated substitution
y1 = ✏1
y2 = y1 + ✏2 = ✏1 + ✏2
y3 = y2 + ✏3 = ✏1 + ✏2 + ✏3
...
yt =
Pt
j=1 ✏j
Which has the variance
var(yt) = t 
2
✏
Then it is easy to see that the variance is not constant, and that if t ! 1, then
var(yt)!1.
We cannot test if   = 1 directly, therefore we take the first diﬀerence of yt by
subtracting yt 1 from both sides. We then get
 yt = (    1)yt 1 + ✏t
and now we can test if the coeﬃcient (    1) is equal to zero. This is very similar
to a t-test of the coeﬃcient, but under the null-hypothesis of the series being a
random walk the distribution does not follow a standard t-distribution. Therefore
we need to use the critical values found by David Dickey and Wayne Fuller, this
is the standard Dickey-Fuller test of stationarity.
The standard Dickey-Fuller test assumes that the residuals of the model are uncor-
related with residuals in earlier periods, i.e. no autocorrelation, this is often not
the case. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test includes lagged variables of  yt to
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make the residuals uncorrelated over time. We often use information criteria (ex-
plained in appendix section A.4) to determine the number of lags to include in the
test.
The critical values of the test also depends on whether we include a constant term
and/or deterministic trend. Therefore, we need to determine if the series has a
constant or a trend before running the test.
4.3 Cointegration
As explained in section 4.2, there can exist linear combinations of two I(1) series
that will have residuals that exhibit I(0) behavior. This implies that even though
both series has increasing variance, they will not drift too far from each other. If
we have two I(1) series, we can have the regression
yt = ↵ +  xt + ✏t (4.5)
where ↵ and   is constant. If yt and xt are cointegrated, then we will get an
error term that is I(0). The formal definition of cointegration given in Engle and
Granger (1987) is
“The components of the vector xt are said to be co-integrated of order
d, b, denoted xt ⇠ CI(d, b), if (i) all components of xt are I(d); (ii)
there exists a vector ↵(6= 0) so that zt = ↵0xt ⇠ I(d   b), b > 0. The
vector is called the co-integrating vector.”
For ✏t to be I(0) when both yt and xt are I(1), the long run relationship between
the I(1) variables is stable so it is the short run components that dominate ✏t.
✏t can then be interpreted as deviations from equilibrium in period t, and when
✏t 6= 0, then there will be forces pulling the system back to equilibrium. However,
note that the empirical equilibrium found in cointegrated relationships are the
average relationship between two, or more, series over the sample period, which
is not the same as equilibrium used in economic theory. But the two are not
unrelated, if we cannot find evidence for cointegration, then we should question
whether the theoretical equilibrium really exists in practice.
If equation 4.5 consists of two I(1) series, then the long run coeﬃcient   can be
estimated consistently with OLS if it exists and if xt and yt cointegrates. Then
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✏t will be a stationary process only reflecting the short run dynamics (Engle and
Granger, 1987). If there are more than two variables in the cointegration equation,
then there can exist more than one cointegration vector between these variables.
Johansen (1988) developed a method to find the number of cointegrated vectors,
which I explain in more detail section 4.3.3.
4.3.1 Error correction model
There is a close relationship between cointegration and the error correction model
(ECM). The ECM shows the adjustment process when the variables deviate from
their long run relationship. An example of a ECM representation is
 Xt =
k 1X
i=1
 i Xt i + ↵ Xt k + ✏t (4.6)
Where the short run coeﬃcients are in the  -matrix, the long run relations are
the  -vector, and the adjustment coeﬃcients are in the ↵-vector.
The error correction model explains short run fluctuations while still being con-
sistent with the long run relationship. The idea is that a proportion of the dis-
equilibrium from the long run relationship from one period is corrected in the
next period. For example if consumption is too low compared to the long run
relationship, this will be corrected back to equilibrium over several periods, not
immediately (Engle and Granger, 1987).
The Granger representation theorem states that cointegrated variables will have
a ECM representation, and that cointegration gives a statistical reason to use
ECM representation. Engle and Granger (1987) suggests the following two-step
approach to model cointegrated variables. First, one needs to estimate the cointe-
gration equation. Then one estimates a error correction model that includes the
residuals of the cointegration equation (lagged one period) instead of the level-
variables. The main challenge when building a ECM is often to find the cointe-
gration equation, and then to find the relevant variables in explaining the short
run fluctuations.
4.3.2 Weak exogeneity
A central assumption behind building a single equation ECM, is weak exogeneity.
This is related to which variable that adjusts to maintain the long run relation-
ship. Estimation of the conditional consumption function implicitly assumes that
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consumption is the only variable that equilibrium corrects. We can test this as-
sumption by testing if the coeﬃcients in the ↵-vector, related to the other vari-
ables, also called the loadings, are significantly diﬀerent from zero. The way we
do this is to restrict these variables to zero when doing an analysis of the relevant
cointegrated VAR, and then doing an likelihood-ratio test on the restrictions.16 If
the restrictions pass the test, then we have statistical support for estimating the
conditional consumption function (Bårdsen and Nymoen, 2014).
4.3.3 Johansen-method
One way of testing for cointegration is to test if the residuals of a ECM-model is
stationary. However, this method is not able to test for more than one cointegrat-
ing relationship. I will therefore use the Johansen-method, introduced by Søren
Johansen in his paper from 1988.
We start with a general VAR model where the residuals (✏t) are well behaved.
Again, I write the general ECM model from equation 4.6, but writing ↵  = ⇧,
where ⇧ is a matrix with the coeﬃcients for the lagged variables in levels
 Xt =
k 1X
i=1
 i Xt i + ⇧Xt k + ✏t (4.7)
Here, Xt is a vector of the variables and the coeﬃcients will be matrices with
dimensions equal to the number of variables. The coeﬃcients of interest when
testing for cointegration are in the ⇧-matrix, since this catches the long run rela-
tionships between the variables, while coeﬃcients in the  -matrix model the short
run dynamics.
The way we test for cointegration is by testing if the eigenvalues of the ⇧-matrix is
significantly diﬀerent from zero.17 This is the same as determining the rank of the
matrix since the rank is given as the number of non-zero eigenvalues in a matrix.
To find the matrix’ rank OxMetrics will use the trace test which has the following
test statistic
 trace(r) =  T
KX
i=r+1
ln(1   ˆi) (4.8)
16The likelihood ratio test (LR test) is a statistical test to compare the goodness of fit of two
models. The first (null) model usually includes special restrictions on the general (alternative)
model.
17Eigenvalues are a special set of scalars associated with a linear system of equations (i.e., a
matrix equation) that are sometimes also known as characteristic roots.
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where T is the number of observations,  ˆi is the estimated value of the i’th eigen-
value, r is the rank we test for, andK is the is the number of estimated eigenvalues.
The critical values depend on the number of endogenous and exogenous variables,
as well as the inclusion of deterministic terms like trend and constant. OxMetrics
does not report the correct p-values, so instead of relying on the p-values from
OxMetrics I use the critical values estimated by Doornik (2003).
We rank the estimated eigenvalues and test the largest one first. For the first test
the null hypothesis is that the rank of the matrix is zero, while the alternative
hypothesis is that the rank is strictly larger than zero. If we reject the null hypoth-
esis, we can test for rank smaller or equal to one against the alternative hypothesis
of rank strictly larger than one. We continue in this way until we can not reject
the null hypothesis. If we, for example, reject the null hypothesis of rank zero,
but cannot reject the null hypothesis of rank smaller or equal to one, this points
to the rank being one, which means that there is one cointegrating equation.
With this in mind, I turn to the analysis. First, I present the data series and their
properties with regards to transformations and stationarity. I explain how some
of them are constructed and their sources. In several instances the series have
been constructed from diﬀerent sources and I then explain the reasoning behind
the choices made.
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5 Data
This chapter presents the data series used in the analysis. When doing the analysis
it is important to be familiar with the data, to know how the series are constructed,
and the diﬀerent sources. The series used, together with the sources are listen in
appendix section A.1. I use a dataset with quarterly data, beginning in the first
quarter of 1970, with the last observation in the fourth quarter of 2015, with
some exceptions that I return to below. I use the real values of the variables,
deflated by the price index for consumption goods (PC).18 I log-transform the
series for consumption, income and the diﬀerent series for wealth because the log-
transformed series are more likely to be diﬀerence stationary. I keep the interest
rate, age variable and the diﬀerent measures for inequality in levels.
In chapter 6 I use the same dataset as in Jansen (2013). Since his analysis we have
had several revisions of the data series, so in chapter 7 and 8 I use the revised
data series. It is also the revised series that are presented in this chapter.
5.1 The data series
The main focus in this thesis is the consumption variable. In my analysis I use
total consumption exclusive of health services and services from housing (C). The
rationale behind excluding expenditures on health services is that this is mostly
determined by public policy decisions and not by the households themselves. Con-
sumption of housing services follow the movements in the housing capital, which is
how this is calculated in the national accounts. In other words it depends greatly
on the housing market, and therefore does not always reflect consumer choices.
(Frøiland, 1999) Another factor is that this definition of private consumption is
the endogenous variable in Statistics Norway’s KVARTS-model.
As discussed in the theory chapter, including durable goods in household con-
sumption is problematic since we really would like to measure the consumption
of the services from these goods, but measuring the use of durable goods is very
diﬃcult. In total, the consumption variable included in the analysis accounts for
about 75% of total private consumption in the national accounts.
The income variable (Y ) is total disposable income less dividend income which has
been taken out because of a large spike in dividend payouts around 2005. This
18The only exception is the consumption variable that is deflated by PCPEB. This is a price
deflator related to the consumption variable that I use, i.e. excluding prices of health services
and services from housing.
41
was a consequence of changes in taxation and did probably not aﬀect household
consumption since most of the dividend payouts were reinvested.
Consumption Income 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
11.00
11.25
11.50
11.75
12.00
12.25
12.50
Figure 6: Series for consumption and income, deflated and log-transformed.
The diﬀerent ways to measure household wealth (W ) was discussed in section
3.2. I build on Brodin and Nymoen (1992) and use their wealth variable for net
household wealth. A criticism of the wealth variable from Brodin and Nymoen
(1992) is that it undervalues housing wealth. However, finding better series that
reflect market value, available for the whole sample period, is diﬃcult. The most
important feature of the series is that it reflects the changes in market value, even
though the value is on a lower level than market value.
In chapter 8 I use the diﬀerent wealth components separately. The house wealth
variable is, as mentioned, the same as in Brodin and Nymoen (1992). The series for
financial wealth and debt is collected from two data sources, I briefly go through
the construction of these series in section 5.1.2
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Net wealth 
Debt 
Housing wealth 
Financial wealth 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
13.0
13.5
14.0
14.5
15.0
15.5
Figure 7: Wealth variables, deflated and log-transformed.
In addition, I also use the two exogenous variables from Jansen (2013), the after-
tax real interest rate and a variable for the age-composition. These are shown in
figure 8.
The after-tax real interest rate is constructed as follows
r = i ⇤ (1  t)  ⇡ (5.1)
Where i is the average interest rate paid on house loans (the nominal interest
rate), t is the average tax rate, and ⇡ is the inflation rate.
The age-variable is defined as the number of people aged 50-66 divided by the
number of people between 20 and 49, and 67 years and up.
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Age-variable 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
0.30
0.35
0.40
After-tax real interest rate 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
-0.05
0.00
0.05
Figure 8: Age-variable and the after-tax real interest rate.
I have now presented the variables that are used in chapter 6. In the following two
subsections I present the variables that are added to the model. First, I present
the series for economic inequality, then the financial data series.
5.1.1 Income distribution
Economic inequality is a complex notion and capturing a country’s inequality
with a single measure is, to say the least, optimistic. I have chosen to focus in
the income distribution, and focus on two diﬀerent variables that may capture
changes to the income distribution in Norway. The first is an adjusted version of
the well-known Gini coeﬃcient, the other is the wage share of the economy.
The Gini coeﬃcient measures inequality on a scale from 0 to 1, where 0 is complete
equality (everyone earning the same amount) and 1 is complete inequality (one
person earning all of the nation’s income). One can use the Gini coeﬃcient for
both income and wealth, here I will use the Gini for the distribution of income.
In Aaberge (2007), Rolf Aaberge shows how he constructs two new variables that
are “close relatives” to the standard Gini coeﬃcient. He created Gini coeﬃcients
that are more sensitive to changes in the upper or lower end of the distribution
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curve. The theory behind including the income distribution in my analysis states
that individuals with a higher income will have a lower MPC, I therefore use the
version of the Gini coeﬃcient most sensitive to changes in the upper end of the
income distribution. However, the development in the diﬀerent Gini series is very
similar so this should not aﬀect my results. As for the income-variable described
above, the Gini is estimated on the income distribution where dividend payments
have been taken out.
Gini Adjusted Gini 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
0.175
0.200
0.225
0.250
Wage share 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
0.65
0.70
0.75
Figure 9: Time series for the income distribution.
A problem with using the Gini coeﬃcient is that it is estimated in yearly fre-
quency. To be able to use the series together with quarterly data, the series was
transformed so that the average of the growth rates of each quarter with respect
to the corresponding quarter of the previous year, is equal to the annual growth
rate of the original series.19
The second measure of inequality that is used is the wage share of the economy.
This is calculated as total wages divided by total income. The relationship between
inequality and the wage share is complex, and the wage share is not a direct
measure of inequality, but one can expect that there is correlation between the
two. The wage share measures the share of national income going to wages as
19This was done in a statistical software called Troll, using the function “spatq”.
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opposed to capital-owners.20 It is reasonable to assume that income from wages
are more equally distributed than the income going to capital owners. If the capital
owners are more concentrated in the top of the income distribution, then a smaller
wage share would, ceteris paribus, lead to more inequality. Empirically, this seems
to be the case. There seems to be evidence suggesting that the inequality is
greater between owners of capital and non-capital owners, than inequality within
the group of non-capital owners. Therefore the aggregate eﬀect should be that a
larger wage share reduces inequality.
Checchi and García-Peñalosalosa (2010) argues that there is a close relationship
between the wage share and income inequality, after studying a panel of OECD
countries for the period 1960-2000. Francese and Mulas-Granados (2015) claims
that the most important determinant of income inequality is not the share of
national income that goes to labor or capital, but the dispersion of wages, which
should be picked up by the Gini.
5.1.2 Financial data series
In chapter 8 the goal is to analyze if the diﬀerent components of wealth could be
used to improve the model for consumption. Using data from households’ financial
balances gives us the opportunity to separate the variable for financial wealth into
diﬀerent categories, depending on the degree of liquidity. Here, I follow in the
footsteps of Krogh (2008), which did a project on this in Statistics Norway in
2008.
We have two diﬀerent sources for the data of households’ financial balances, FIN-
DATR and FINSE. FINDATR was a database held by Norges Bank and contains
data from fourth quarter of 1975 up until the first quarter of 2003. In 2003 the
quarterly financial accounts were revised and the new database FINSE (FINan-
cial SEctor accounts) replaced FINDATR. FINSE contains data from the fourth
quarter of 1995.
Both FINSE and FINDATR contains data on the financial balance sheet of house-
holds. I divide the financial wealth into three diﬀerent series by the degree of
liquidity. The first, and most liquid category, contains cash and bank deposits,
the second is less liquid and contains stocks, bonds and other financial assets, the
final category contains insurance claims.
20This is a simplification. Capital income (total income minus wages) does not go directly
to capital owners as profit. There are several costs that the capital income must cover. For
example; capital income must cover depreciation of capital and cost of capital. However, wage
share can still be a measure of how much of the income that goes to labor.
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FINDATR 
Constructed 
FINSE 
 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
250000
500000
750000
1000000
1250000
1500000
Figure 10: Nominal series from FINSE and FINDATR for stocks, bonds and other
financial assets.
Since FINSE only have data back to 1995, we use the data in FINDATR to con-
struct a series going back to 1975. I compute the growth rates for each of the three
categories in FINDATR, and then use these to construct FINSE backwards. So
from the fourth quarter in 1995 I use the series from FINSE, while earlier obser-
vations will follow the growth rates from FINDATR. Figure 10 shows the original
series from FINSE and FINDATR together with the constructed series back to
1975 for the category containing stocks, bonds and other financial wealth (the
conclusion is the same for the other categories). We see that the two series follow
each other closely for the period where we have observations from both databases,
but being on diﬀerent levels. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the growth
rates of FINDATR are representative for the actual developments in the financial
balance sheet for households up until 1995. Figure 11 shows the three series for
financial wealth that are used in my analysis.
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Cash and bank deposits 
Insurance claims 
Stocks, bonds and other financial assets 
 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
12.0
12.5
13.0
13.5
14.0
Figure 11: The diﬀerent components of financial wealth, deflated and log-
transformed.
5.2 Stationarity of the series
It is important to know if the series are stationary or not. I have therefore con-
ducted augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests on the series that are used in the
analysis. These test are documented in section A.5 of the appendix. The log-
transformed variables of consumption, income, and all financial variables are I(1)
variables, i.e. they become stationary when taking the first diﬀerence. The same
is true for the interest rate and the wage share in levels. The Gini coeﬃcient is
clearly not stationary in levels, but the results are more ambiguous for the first
diﬀerence series. The AGE-variable is more uncertain, it passes some tests in
levels, but not when diﬀerenced. In my analysis I will treat all variables as I(1).
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6 Replication of previous results
This chapter begins the analysis by presenting the replicated model from Jansen
(2013), and by illustrating the break-down that happened during the financial
crisis. The first section goes trough the replication of the model, section 6.2 shows
the dismal forecasting performance of the model since the financial crisis. Jansen
(2013) forecasted up until the last quarter of 2009, and noted already then that the
model seemed to overpredict consumption in the last quarters. This chapter will
be the backdrop for the following chapters which attempt to improve the model
presented here.
6.1 Replication of Jansen (2013)
I follow the analysis in Jansen (2013) and build a VAR with five lags in the
endogenous variables consumption (c), income (y) and wealth (w), all in logs.21 I
include one lag of the age-variable (AGE) and the real interest rate (RR), which
is allowed to enter the cointegration space. This implies that the real interest
rate is considered a policy variable, that varies exogenously and is not aﬀected
by variation in the other variables. I also include a time trend, centered seasonal
dummies, and an event-dummy (CPSTOP ). CPSTOP is included to pick up
the eﬀects from a wage price freeze in 1978-79.22 The real interest rate is set to
zero up until the fourth quarter of 1983. This is because it most likely had a very
modest relevance in this period because of credit constraints.
Eigenvalue Hypotheses on rank Trace tests ( trace)
 i H0 HA  trace 5% critical value*
0.1910 r = 0 r   1 59.31 57.32
0.1052 r  1 r   2 27.74 35.96
0.0723 r  2 r = 3 11.18 18.16
Tests of the VAR(5) system
Sample period: 1970(2) - 2008(2)
Vector AR 1-5 test: F (45, 312) = 1.04 (0.406)
Vector normality test:  2(6) = 2.85 (0.828)
Vector heteroscedasticity test: F (270, 592) = 1.09 (0.195)
*Critical values are from Doornik (2003)
Table 2: Johansen test for replication model.
21I do not get exactly the same results as Jansen (2013), this is most likely due to diﬀerences
in transformations of the variables (for example in constructing the real interest rate). However,
the diﬀerences are small and do not change the qualitative results.
22In fact, two sets of seasonal dummies are included. The second set is to account for a change
in the way the quarterly income statistics is constructed that happened in 2001.
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The VAR is well-behaved, meaning it passes tests for autocorrelation, heterogene-
ity and normality. The Johansen-analysis concludes that there is one cointegrating
relationship. The test results are shown in table 2.
These results let us condition on one cointegration vector in the further analysis,
we can then test further restrictions on the long run equation. I begin with an
identifying restriction (setting the coeﬃcient for c = 1). The first thing we observe
is that the trend is insignificant, so I can restrict this to zero. In the next step,
AGE is restricted to zero, this also passes the statistical test. Restricting the
loadings of income and wealth is also accepted, meaning that they are weakly
exogenous. Finally, we find that the homogeneity-restriction is accepted. The
results are given in table 3.
(1) Model without testable restrictions
c =  yy +  ww +  RRRR+  AGEAGE +  Trend
Log L: 1163.19
(2) Restricting   = 0
c = 0.73y + 0.24w   0.22RR+ 0.14AGE
(0.04) (0.02) (0.27) (0.14)
↵c = 0.53, ↵y =  0.06, ↵w =  0.11
(0.11) (0.10) (0.15)
Log L: 1162.97;  2(1) = 0.44 (p-value = 0.508)
(3) Restricting   = 0 and  AGE = 0
c = 0.71y + 0.24w   0.42RR
(0.04) (0.02) (0.18)
↵c = 0.55, ↵y =  0.08, ↵w =  0.09
(0.12) (0.11) (0.15)
Log L: 1162.43;  2(2) = 1.51 (p-value = 0.471);  2(1) = 1.07 (p-value = 0.301)
(4) Restricting   = 0,  AGE = 0, ↵y = 0 and ↵w = 0
c = 0.72y + 0.24w + 0.48RR
(0.04) (0.02) (0.19)
↵c = 0.59
(0.11)
Log L: 1161.96;  2(4) = 2.46 (p-value = 0.651);  2(2) = 0.96 (p-value = 0.620)
(5) Restricting   = 0,  AGE = 0,  y +  w = 1, ↵y = 0 and ↵w = 0
c = 0.78y + 0.22w   0.71RR
( ) (0.02) (0.17)
↵c = 0.52
(0.11)
Log L: 1160.13;  2(5) = 6.11 (p-value = 0.296);  2(1) = 3.64 (p-value = 0.056)
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Sample period: 1970(2) - 2008(2)
Small letters indicate log-transformed variable.
Table 3: Testing restrictions on the cointegration vector for replication model.
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This gives us the following long run relationship between consumption, income,
wealth and the real interest rate
ecm = c  0.78yt   0.22wt + 0.71RRt 1 (6.1)
Figure 12 shows the beta-coeﬃcients estimated recursively, we can see that these
are stable from the mid-1990s onwards.23
beta wealth × +/-2 st. errors 
1990 1995 2000 2005
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
beta interest rate × +/-2 st. errors 
1990 1995 2000 2005
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
Figure 12: Long run coeﬃcients for wealth and interest rate.
We are now ready to estimate the conditional consumption function. This is a
ECM-model including the ecm variable from equation 6.1 as the long run solution
(lagged one period). I now specify a rich model including four lags of the first-
diﬀerenced series in consumption, income, wealth, and the interest rate, and use
the GETS-modeling tool Autometrics to end up with a parsimonious model.24 25
Seasonal dummies are still included, but not CPSTOP .
23Because we have imposed the homogeneity-restriction, we only get the standard errors and
the recursive graphics for the wealth coeﬃcient, and not for income.
24The estimated general model is given in table 12 in the appendix.
25Autometrics is a computer implementation of general-to-specific modeling, for more infor-
mation see appendix or Doornik and Hendry (2013a,b).
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Model: (1): 1971(2)-2008(4) (2): 1971(2)-2008(4)
coeﬃcient t-value coeﬃcient t-value
 ct 4 0.2615 3.93 0.2706 4.07
constant -0.4272 -7.93 -0.1072 -0.726
 yt 0.2091 2.34 0.1998 2.22
 yt 1 -0.2855 -3.36 -0.2878 -3.36
 yt 2 -0.3164 -3.81 -0.3272 -3.91
 wt 0.1606 2.67 0.1924 3.13
 wt 1 0.2046 3.17 0.1913 2.89
ecmt 1 -0.5569 -8.05
ct 1 -0.5878 -8.19
yt 1 0.4251 7.48
wt 1 0.1330 6.14
RRt 2 -0.2294 -2.00
SE regression 1.89% 1.89%
Tests: Statistics Value (p-value) Statistics Value (p-value)
AR 1-5 test: F(5,131) 0.89 (0.493) F(5,128) 1.16 (0.332)
ARCH 1-4 test: F(4,143) 0.58 (0.676) F(3,143) 0.31 (0.868)
Normality test:  2(2) 0.11 (0.946)  2(2) 0.16 (0.922)
Heteroscedasticity test: F(21,129) 1.43 (0.115) F(27,123) 1.20 (0.252)
Reset test: F(2,134) 0.08 (0.923) F(2,131) 0.18 (0.832)
Seasonal dummies not reported
Sample period: 1971(2) - 2008(4)
Table 4: Replication of ECM for  c.
Table 4 shows the coeﬃcients of the ECM model. I estimate the model both with
the ecm as a variable, and with the level variables separately (model (2)). We
see that the coeﬃcients of the level variables in model (2) corresponds well with
the ones implied in model (1). All variables in the table are significant at a 5%
significance level. As figure 13 shows, the model fits the data well during the
sample period.
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Figure 13: Replication model fit with residuals.
In the next section I use model (1) estimated on data up until the last quar-
ter of 2008 to forecast future growth in consumption and show how the model
consistently over-estimates this growth.
6.2 Break-down during the financial crisis
I now use model (1) in the previous section to forecast growth in consumption after
2008, i.e. ex post forecasts. These are dynamic 1-step ahead forecasts up until
the second quarter of 2014, 22 quarters in total. Figure 14 shows the forecasts
against the realized values. The figure also shows confidence bands equal to two
standard errors. It is easy to see that the forecasts consistently fail to predict
the growth in consumption. Another illustration of the break is to estimate the
model on a larger sample and then plot the recursively estimated coeﬃcients of
the ECM-model, this is figure 20 in the appendix. This shows a clear break of
the ECM-coeﬃcient and the constant around 2009, the other coeﬃcients are more
stable, which points to a break especially in the long run relationship.
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Figure 14: Dynamic one-step forecasts for the replication model.
6.3 Progress since 2008
Since the break was clear, there has been attempts of improving the model. In their
KVARTS-model, Statistics Norway has solved the problem by including a step-
dummy from the second quarter of 2009. This improves the forecasting, but is not
satisfactory as an explanation of the weak development of household consumption.
Other papers has tried to explain the weakening of household consumption in
Norway, as discussed in section 3.2, but no improved model has emerged.
Since Jansen (2013) there has been revisions to the data series. The revisions
should result in a better quality of the data, but may also impact the results.
The revisions were small for most series, but for the series of financial wealth,
the changes were more substantial. Reestimating the model with the new dataset
gives no improvement in forecasting and the break is still present. In addition we
get problems with the diagnostic tests in the cointegration analysis. I also find
that the AGE-variable is significant in the cointegration vector, while the interest
rate has become insignificant. The homogeneity-restriction is also rejected with
the new dataset.
In the rest of this thesis, I use the most current dataset with the revised series.
The following chapter presents my analysis of the income distribution eﬀect on
consumption.
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7 Income distribution
This chapter presents the investigation into the eﬀect of the income distribution
on private consumption. I use two separate variables for the income distribution.
The first is an adjusted version of the standard Gini coeﬃcient, as explained in
section 5.1.1 (from now on I often refer to this as Gini for short), and the latter
variable is the wage share of the economy.
The intuition behind looking at economic inequality as a variable for consumption
is that people tend to spend a smaller portion of their income on consumption
as they become more wealthy, i.e. they have a lower MPC. We would therefore
expect that if a larger share of the economy’s income went to those in the upper
end of the income distribution, then aggregate consumption would be lower than
it would be if the income was evenly spread out across the population. This
notion is nothing new, Keynes (1936) discussed how the income distribution would
aﬀect consumption through the lower MPC of wealthy individuals, but even if
Keynes argued for this relationship it has not been widely included in consumption
functions. However, with several countries experiencing changes to their income
distributions, together with an increased focus on inequality both in the public
and among researchers, there is more research focusing on the relationship between
income inequality and private consumption.
7.1 Using the adjusted Gini variable
I begin with a large VAR, then use tests for model reduction and information
criteria to end up with a VAR with four lags in the endogenous variables. I
include consumption, income and wealth as endogenous variables, and the real
interest rate, AGE and Gini as exogenous variables, all of which may enter the
cointegration space, as well as a trend. I include lagged, diﬀerenced variables
for the exogenous series to pick up autocorrelation, I include three lags of the
first diﬀerenced variables unrestricted, this is to go as far back as the endogenous
variables (because  xt 3 = xt 3   xt 4). The deterministic terms are a constant
and two sets of seasonal dummies (as in the replication analysis). The sample
period is between the first quarter of 1986 up until the first quarter of 2014, since
this is the last observation for the Gini-series. 1986 is a natural starting point as
it is right after the credit liberalization in Norway.
The test statistics do not detect autocorrelation and the residuals are normally
distributed, but there seems to be some problems with heteroscedasticity, but
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I still continue with the analysis. When testing for cointegration we find one
cointegrating relationship in our analysis. Results from the Johansen analysis is
given in table 5.
Eigenvalue Hypotheses on rank Trace tests ( trace)
 i H0 HA  trace 5% critical value*
0.2831 r = 0 r   1 66.69 64.48
0.1294 r  1 r   2 29.08 40.95
0.1120 r  2 r = 3 13.43 20.89
Tests of the VAR(4) system
Sample period: 1986(1) - 2014(1)
Vector AR 1-5 test: F (45, 199) = 1.18 (0.222)
Vector normality test:  2(6) = 9.81 (0.133)
Vector heteroscedasticity test: F (306, 343) = 1.2366 (0.028)
*Critical values are from Doornik (2003)
Table 5: Johansen test for cointegration when including Gini coeﬃcient.
Further, I condition on there being one cointegration relationship, we can then
test more restrictions on the long run relationship. I begin with an identifying
restriction to the system (setting the coeﬃcient for consumption to 1), and then
stepwise adding more restrictions, this process is shown in table 6.
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(1) Model without testable restrictions
c =  yy +  ww +  RRRR+  AGEAGE +  GiniGini+  Trend
Log L: 944.18
(2) Restricting   = 0
c = 0.80y   0.12w   0.89RR+ 2.20AGE + 1.74Gini
(0.13) (0.07) (0.43) (0.55) (2.07)
↵c = 0.27, ↵y =  0.04, ↵w =  0.37
(0.07) (0.05) (0.10)
Log L: 943.38;  2(1) = 1.60 (p-value = 0.21)
(3) Restricting   = 0 and  RR = 0
c = 0.83y   0.16w + 2.65AGE + 1.98Gini
(0.16) (0.09) (0.63) (2.46)
↵c = 0.26, ↵y =  0.03, ↵w =  0.27
(0.06) (0.05) (0.09)
Log L: 941.34;  2(2) = 5.63 (p-value = 0.06);  2(1) = 4.02 (p-value = 0.045)
(4) Restricting   = 0,  RR = 0, ↵y = 0 and ↵w = 0
c = 0.67y + 0.04w + 1.54AGE + 1.42Gini
(0.11) (0.06) (0.42) (1.64)
↵c = 0.48
(0.10)
Log L: 937.61;  2(4) = 13.13 (p-value = 0.01);  2(2) = 7.33 (p-value = 0.026)
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Sample period: 1986(1) - 2014(1)
Small letters indicate log-transformed variable.
Table 6: Testing restrictions on the cointegration vector when including Gini co-
eﬃcient.
Even when restricting the other insignificant variables (trend and interest rate),
and laying restrictions on the loadings, the Gini stays insignificant and positive,
which is clearly in contradiction to the theory because it implies that higher in-
equality gives higher consumption.
The fact that the Gini coeﬃcient is insignificant and positive is a strong argument
that the Gini is not a long-term determinant of private consumption, and should
not be included in the long-run equation used in the ECM-model. Including the
Gini in the short run dynamics would not be appropriate, both because the income
distribution changes relatively slow, and because the Gini-series used in this thesis
is constructed from yearly data so they do not really include information about
changes in the income distribution between quarters. The negative results are
discussed in more detail in the final section of this chapter.
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7.2 Using wage share
As the previous section showed, the Gini coeﬃcient did not give any significant
eﬀect on consumption. The second variable that could pick up the eﬀect of unequal
distribution of income is the wage share of the economy. The intuition behind this
is that the ownership of capital is less equally distributed than the income of
labour. Since capital also earns income which inevitably ends up to the owners
of that capital, there is likely to be a diﬀerent propensity to consume out of the
capital income compared to wages. My hypothesis is that when wages get a larger
share of the income in the economy, then the aggregate consumption would also
increase.
I conduct the analysis in the same way as in the previous section, but with data
until the fourth quarter of 2015. I find that a VAR in consumption, income and
wealth with four lags is well specified. With one lag in the interest rate, the age
variable and wage share as exogenous variables, with the same dummies as the
previous chapter and a trend.
Eigenvalue Hypotheses on rank Trace tests ( trace)
 i H0 HA  trace 5% critical value*
0.2302 r = 0 r   1 64.57 64.48
0.1647 r  1 r   2 33.96 40.95
0.1044 r  2 r = 3 12.90 20.89
Tests of the VAR(4) system
Sample period: 1986(4) - 2015(4)
Vector AR 1-5 test: F (45, 211) = 1.10 (0.323)
Vector normality test:  2(6) = 8.80 (0.185)
Vector heteroscedasticity test: F (306, 366) = 1.279 (0.012)
*Critical values are from Doornik (2003)
Table 7: Johansen test for cointegration when including wage share.
As table 7 shows, there is support for one cointegrating vector with a test statistic
slightly larger than the critical value for 5% significance value. As in the previous
section, I condition on one cointegration vector and an identifying restriction,
before imposing more restrictions on the long run equation. Table 8 summarizes
this process.
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(1) Model without testable restrictions
c =  yy +  ww +  RRRR+  AGEAGE +  GiniWageShare+  Trend
Log L: 986.51
(2) Restricting   = 0
c = 0.92y   0.13w + 1.35RR+ 1.62AGE + 0.11WageShare
(0.09) (0.07) (0.45) (0.47) (0.26)
↵c = 0.23, ↵y =  0.03, ↵w =  0.33
(0.06) (0.05) (0.10)
Log L: 986.47 ;  2(1) = 0.08 (p-value = 0.775)
(3) Restricting   = 0 and  RR = 0
c = 0.89y   0.10w + 1.74AGE + 0.08WageShare
(0.09) (0.08) (0.49) (0.28)
↵c = 0.28, ↵y =  0.01, ↵w =  0.19
(0.07) (0.06) (0.11)
Log L: 982.76;  2(2) = 7.51 (p-value = 0.023);  2(1) = 7.09 (p-value = 0.008)
(4) Restricting   = 0 and  RR = 0, ↵y = 0 and ↵w = 0
c = 0.76y + 0.15w + 1.30AGE + 0.03WageShare
(0.07) (0.06) (0.39) (0.22)
↵c = 0.37
(0.09)
Log L: 981.39;  2(4) = 10.23 (p-value = 0.037);  2(2) = 3.26 (p-value = 0.194)
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Sample period: 1986(4) - 2015(4)
Small letters indicate log-transformed variable.
Table 8: Testing restrictions on the cointegration vector when including wage
share.
Again, we see that the coeﬃcient for wage share is insignificant independently of
the imposed restrictions, but now the coeﬃcient has the “correct” sign. When
including the wage share we are not able to restrict the interest rate coeﬃcient to
be zero, nor can we restrict the loadings to zero. We also note that the coeﬃcient
for the age-variable is positive and significant. The sum of the income and wealth
coeﬃcient is 0.91, not far from homogeneity.
Given that the wage share, nor the Gini was significant in the long run solution, I
do not continue with building an ECM-model that includes the income distribu-
tion.
7.3 Is the income distribution insignificant?
There can be several reasons for the lack of positive results from including variables
of income inequality. It may be due to the inability of the series included in
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measuring income inequality. We know that there are several weaknesses from
these measures. As mentioned, the Gini is originally a series with yearly frequency,
this may pose several problems when including it as quarterly data. The wage
share is not a direct measure of inequality per se, but rather a proxy which could be
disputed. It could also be the case that income inequality is not the best measure
of economic inequality between households, wealth also plays an important role.
Another reason for why income inequality does not seem to have an eﬀect on
consumption could be that the changes in inequality in Norway since 1986 are
not big enough. It could be that larger shifts in inequality would have a more
profound eﬀect on consumption, but Norway is still a relatively equal society with
regards to income.
A better way to research the relationship between the income distribution and
private consumption could be to look at microdata. By looking at data for the
diﬀerent income cohorts, it might be possible to estimate how much of their in-
come that goes to consumption. However, estimating this eﬀect on aggregate
consumption would still be diﬃcult and is a topic for future research.
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8 Investigation of wealth eﬀects
While chapter 7 looked at the income distribution, this chapter builds a new
consumption function where the diﬀerent wealth components can have separate
eﬀects on consumption. The diﬀerent components were thoroughly presented in
chapter 5. In the long run, I separate housing wealth and financial wealth, while
in the short run I split financial wealth according to liquidity, and include debt as
a separate variable.
The first section presents a new long run relationship that builds on Eilev Jansen’s
research on the consumption function in the spring of 2016. Then I continue with
an ECM model where I estimate the separate wealth eﬀects. The last section
of this chapter shows that the new ECM model forecasts better than the model
presented in chapter 6.
8.1 A new long run equation
The methods for finding the long run equation is the same as for the previous
chapters. I build a VAR with consumption (c), income (y) and net housing wealth
(wH) as the endogenous variables, with five lags. As exogenous variables, I include
one lag of the after-tax real interest rate (RR) and net financial wealth (wF ), and
a step dummy for the financial crisis.26 As in the previous analyses I include two
sets of seasonal dummies, as well as a constant and trend. The seasonal dummies
and the constant are unrestricted to enter the cointegration space. I begin the
sample in the first quarter of 1985.
Model reduction down to four lags in the endogenous variables was accepted by
the LR-test (p-value of 0.15), but gives a problem of autocorrelation, therefore it
is better to continue with five lags.
To avoid having to include too many variables in the cointegration analysis, I
have constructed series for net housing wealth and net financial wealth, these
were constructed by subtracting a portion of the total debt from each. Because
it is diﬃcult to know the exact portion of debt that is connected to housing or
financial assets, I use the average relative size of the two components in the sample
period. The portions assigned was 58% of the debt to housing wealth, and 42% to
26The step-dummy FCRISIS takes the value 1 from the third quarter of 2009 to the final
observation.
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financial wealth.27 The relative size has been stable over the period. It is important
to account for debt in the long run analysis, thereby not allowing debt-financed
consumption in the long run.
The model passes tests for autocorrelation and heterogeneity, but not for normally
distributed residuals. Still, it is unlikely that this poses problems for the further
analysis. The results of the Johansen analysis are given in table 9, we find support
for rank equal to one, but we see that the test for rank equal to two fails by a
small margin with a 5% significance level.
Eigenvalue Hypotheses on rank Trace tests ( trace)
 i H0 HA  trace 5% critical value*
0.2070 r = 0 r   1 69.04 64.48
0.1662 r  1 r   2 40.28 40.95
0.1333 r  2 r = 3 17.74 20.89
Tests of the VAR(5) system
Sample period: 1985(1) - 2015(4)
Vector AR 1-5 test: F (45, 241) = 1.36 (0.076)
Vector normality test:  2(6) = 15.74 (0.015)
Vector heteroscedasticity test: F (264, 449) = 1.05 (0.311)
*Critical values are from Doornik (2003)
Table 9: Johansen test with two wealth variables.
I condition on one cointegration relationship and add the identifying restriction
that the coeﬃcient for consumption is equal to one. We see from table 10 that
restricting the coeﬃcients of the trend and for the FCRISIS-dummy to zero is
accepted with a wide margin (p-value for both restrictions of 0.574). Testing for
weak exogeneity of income and housing wealth is also accepted. We therefore have
support for building a conditional consumption function.
27The relative sizes are found after correcting for the size of housing wealth. The level of the
housing wealth in the dataset from Jansen (2013) is most likely too low compared to market
value. To correct for this, the housing wealth variable has been multiplied with a factor of 1.25.
This ratio is the assessed value of housing wealth found in tax returns, to the housing market
variable from Jansen (2013) in 2014. The assessed housing wealth found from tax returns is
expected to be closer to the market value.
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(1) Model without testable restrictions
c =  yy +  wHwH +  wFwF +  RRRR+  FCRISISFCRISIS +  Trend
Log L: 971.11
(2) Restricting   = 0
c = 0.47y + 0.11wH + 0.20wF   0.24RR  0.01FCRISIS
(0.18) (0.02) (0.10) (0.29) (0.02)
↵c = 0.42, ↵y =  0.02, ↵w =  0.41
(0.10) (0.06) (0.23)
Log L: 970.67 ;  2(1) = 0.87 (p-value = 0.351)
(3) Restricting   = 0 and  FCRISIS = 0
c = 0.36y + 0.10wH + 0.26wF   0.24RR
(0.12) (0.02) (0.07) (0.29)
↵c = 0.42, ↵y = 0.01, ↵w =  0.37
(0.10) (0.06) (0.22)
Log L: 970.55;  2(2) = 1.11 (p-value = 0.574);  2(1) = 0.24 (p-value = 0.626)
(4) Restricting   = 0 and  FCRISIS = 0, ↵y = 0 and ↵wH = 0
c = 0.37y + 0.08wH + 0.27wF   0.64RR
(0.13) (0.02) (0.07) (0.31)
↵c = 0.46
(0.09)
Log L: 970.10;  2(4) = 2.01 (p-value = 0.734);  2(2) = 0.90 (p-value = 0.637)
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Sample period: 1985(1) - 2015(4)
Small letters indicate log-transformed variable.
Table 10: Testing restrictions on the cointegration vector when including two
wealth variables.
Table 10 gives us the following long run relationship between consumption, income,
housing wealth, financial wealth and the after-tax real interest rate
ecm = c  0.37y   0.08wH   0.27wF + 0.64RR (8.1)
The first thing to note is the small coeﬃcient for income. It is doubtful that
the marginal propensity to consume out of income is only 0.36 for households
in the long run. This equation also imply that households consume less out of
housing wealth than they do from financial wealth. This is interesting since it
points diﬀerent behavior of households from changes in housing wealth, relative
to financial wealth. A potential weakness of this long run equation is that we are
far from homogeneity, the sum of the coeﬃcients of income, housing wealth and
financial wealth is 0.72.28
28Testing for homogeneity by restricting the sum of the coeﬃcients to one, gives a p-value of
0.0003, i.e. homogeneity is strongly rejected.
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The interest rate eﬀect is negative, as predicted. A lower interest rate will ceteris
paribus lead to higher consumption. With a coeﬃcient of -0.64, the eﬀect is of
similar magnitude to the long run eﬀect found by Jansen (2013) (-0.71) and by
Erlandsen and Nymoen (2008) (-0.42). By looking at the recursively estimated
coeﬃcients for the interest rate (beta RR) in figure 15 we see that the coeﬃcient
for the interest rate has fallen since the mid 1990s.
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Figure 15: Recursive plots of the beta coeﬃcients of the cointegration vector.
Figure 15 shows the coeﬃcients of equation 8.1 recursively estimated. We see
that the coeﬃcients of income (beta y) has declined over the period and that
something happened around the time of the break of the previous model around
late 2007, beginning of 2008. While the coeﬃcient of housing wealth (beta wh)
has been relatively stable in the period, the financial wealth coeﬃcient has gone
from insignificant to more and more significant in later years. The fact that we
see these unstable coeﬃcients points to that there is still something happening
outside the model that aﬀects consumption, this is a weakness of the model.
We see from figure 16, which plots the error correction variable, that this looks
stationary. This is the variable included in the error correction model in the
following section.
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Figure 16: Stationarity of the ecm variable.
8.2 Short run dynamics with separate wealth variables
Now that we have found a long run equation that passes the statistical tests, I can
go on to build an error correction model. To analyze the short run eﬀects a bit
deeper, I now split the wealth variables further. In the short run, it is possible that
the wealth variables have diﬀerent eﬀects on consumption because of diﬀerences in
liquidity or consumers willingness to consume out of that wealth category. I also
want to allow debt to have an independent eﬀect on consumption; a motivation
for this is that highly indebted households could be more cautious and behave
diﬀerently than if they did not have debt. Therefore, I now include two variables
for gross financial wealth, gross housing wealth and debt as separate variables.
Three diﬀerent variables for financial wealth are available, but only finwealth1
(which consists of cash and bank deposits) and finwealth2 (stocks, bonds and
other financial wealth) are included. This means that I do not include the last
category of financial wealth which consists of insurance claims. Insurance claims
are very illiquid and it is unlikely that they aﬀect households’ consumption deci-
sions.
Housing wealth and total debt is also included in the model, thus opening up for
the fact that debt can have asymmetric eﬀects on consumption. In addition to
the wealth variables, I also include disposable income, the interest rate and the
unemployment rate. I first estimate the model in its general form, these results
are reported in table 13 of the appendix. Using the Autometrics software available
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in OxMetrics, I reduce the model to its specific form. The final model is reported
in table 11.
Model: (1): 1986(1)-2013(4)
coeﬃcient t-value
 ct 1 -0.2467 -2.81
 ct 4 0.1758 2.38
constant 0.8291 3.42
 2yt* 0.3512 3.15
 housewealtht 1 0.2121 3.35
 housewealtht 3 -0.1581 -2.55
 finwealth2t 3 0.1257 2.61
ecmt 1 -0.3196 -3.42
SE regression 1.64%
Tests: Statistics Value (p-value)
AR 1-5 test: F(5,93) 1.27 (0.283)
ARCH 1-4 test: F(4,104) 2.20 (0.074)
Normality test:  2(2) 4.93 (0.085)
Heteroscedasticity test: F(21,90) 0.97 (0.510)
Reset test: F(2,96) 1.22 (0.299)
* 2yt = yt   yt 2
Sample period: 1986(1) - 2013(4)
Seasonal dummies not reported.
Table 11: ECM for  c with separate wealth variables.
The model passes diagnostic tests, but the normality and ARCH-test passes only
slightly with p-values of 0.085 and 0.074 respectively. Standard errors of the re-
gression are relatively low with 1.64% and all coeﬃcients are significant. The
reduced model from Autometrics included both the contemporaneous first diﬀer-
ence of income, as well as the first lag, with basically the same coeﬃcients. It was
therefore possible to reduce the model further by including the second diﬀerence
of income; this did not change any of the results.
As a robustness check, the model was estimated with the level variables in the
error correction term included separately, this did not change much in the model;
all the variables still had the same sign and magnitude, and the coeﬃcients of the
ecm variable corresponded well to the coeﬃcients of equation 8.1 found by the
long run analysis.
Housing wealth has a significant positive eﬀect after one quarter, then a negative
eﬀect after three quarters, the total eﬀect is positive. This suggests that higher
house prices initially increases consumption, but that the total impact eﬀect is
small. Since the consumption variable in the model excludes consumption of
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housing services, this small impact eﬀect seems likely. Also, higher house prices
could have the eﬀect of “crowding out” consumption of other goods, which again
suggests that the impact eﬀect of changes to housing wealth on the consumption
variable in the model, should be relatively small.
The only financial wealth variable that comes out as significant is finwealth2,
i.e. stocks, bonds, and other financial wealth. The fact that finwealth1 do not
pass the model reduction suggests that cash and bank deposits are kept mostly
as transaction means, not as a store of wealth, so changes in this type of financial
wealth has no direct eﬀect on consumption. It seems like less liquid financial wealth
is a more significant driver for consumption and that households want to consume
a portion of the increased wealth. Financial wealth is only included in the third
lag in the model, so it takes time before households react to changes in financial
wealth. A reason for this could be that households do not react immediately to
changes in this wealth, but rather wait to see if the change is more permanent.
The finding that the most liquid financial wealth has no impact on consumption
is somewhat controversial. It is in direct contradiction to the conclusions of Ekeli
(1992). He finds that the most liquid wealth has a bigger eﬀect on consumption
than the less liquid financial wealth. An explanation for this could be cultural and
technological changes since 1992. It has become much easier for regular savers
to buy stocks and bonds and to move money between asset classes. This will
also aﬀect the relative significance of the diﬀerent classes of financial wealth on
consumption.
Debt falls out of the model during model reduction. This might be because
debt follows the wealth variables closely and therefore becomes insignificant when
wealth already is included, but it could also be because debt has no significant in-
dependent eﬀect on consumption in the short run. If housing and financial wealth
has short term eﬀects on consumption, but not debt, this points to asymmetric
eﬀects between wealth and debt. However, there are several eﬀects from debt to
consumption, and the decreased disposable income from increased interest pay-
ments are already accounted for in the disposable income variable. Since we use
net wealth variables in the long run analysis, the model includes debt eﬀects in
the long run.
In the general model I also included the first diﬀerence of the after-tax real interest
rate with four lags, these were not significant, and were dropped during the model
reduction process. The lack of short run interest rate eﬀects has also been found
earlier by Jansen (2013), and implies that changes in the interest rate does not
directly aﬀect household consumption in the short run.
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The unemployment rate was also dropped from the final model. This was included
as a proxy for the business cycle. Business cycle developments will aﬀect private
consumption through several channels, most notably through income and wealth,
which is already accounted for in the model. Other eﬀects could be that greater
uncertainty in downturns lead to higher saving, or that the consumption share
of income will increase, because unemployed individuals typically will consume a
larger share of their income because the income has fallen. Since the unemploy-
ment rate is dropped, we find no support for such eﬀects in the model.
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Figure 17: Recursive graphics of the estimated coeﬃcients in the ECM.
Recursive graphics of the estimated coeﬃcients in figure 17 show that both the
estimated constant and coeﬃcient of the error correction term (ecm) is stable in
the estimated period.
8.3 Forecasting performance
For the model in table 11, both the structure (the model reduction) and the
estimated coeﬃcients were estimated on a sample up until the fourth quarter of
2013. So we can use the model to perform ex post one-step forecasts for the change
in consumption. I forecast eight quarters ahead, up until the last quarter of 2015.
Figure shows the forecasts with confidence bars, together with the realized values.
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The model passes parameter constancy tests. The Chow-test passes with a p-value
of 0.92, and the forecast  2(8) test has a p-value of 0.87. Also, we see that the
realized values are within the confidence bars for all quarters, but that the model
still seem to over-predict consumption growth in the third and fourth quarter in
both years. The confidence bars represent two standard errors.
Forecasts Change in consumption 
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Figure 18: Forecasts for the change in consumption.
Finally, I want to convince the reader that the current model is an improvement
from the model in chapter 6. To do this, I estimate the ECM from chapter 6 on a
sample up until the last quarter of 2013 with the “old” cointegration vector, and
perform the same forecasts as in figure 18. To do the forecasts on the same data,
I estimate the “old” model on the revised dataset, the model is presented in table
14 in the appendix, and the forecasts are given in figure 19.
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Figure 19: Forecasts from replicating model.
It is easy to see that the forecasts in figure 18 are a big improvement from those
in figure 19. The old model consistently over-predict consumption growth, and in
the last two quarters, the realized values are outside the confidence bars. Looking
at the test statistics confirms this, the p-value from the  2(8)-test is 0.08, and the
Chow-test has p-value of 0.29, far below that of the “new” model.
The numerical values of the forecasts are given in table 15 and 16 in the appendix.
In the table we also see that the new model does better on every metric. The
Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) is almost three times as big for the replication
model compared to the new model (0.012 vs. 0.033).
To recap, this chapter has shown that by including separate wealth variables in
the model, we find a model that deals better with the break around the financial
crisis. We find that housing wealth and financial wealth has diﬀerent eﬀects on
consumption both in the long and short run. We have also found that the finan-
cial wealth most relevant when modeling consumption is the category containing
stocks, bonds and other financial assets.
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9 Conclusion
The goal of this master’s thesis was to improve the current consumption function
in Statistics Norway’s KVARTS model by testing two diﬀerent hypotheses. The
first was to see whether the income distribution could explain some of the feeble
growth in consumption after the financial crisis, the second was to see if splitting
the wealth variable into diﬀerent components could improve the model.
Two variables were found to capture developments in the income distribution. The
first variable is the well-known Gini coeﬃcient, which was modified to be more
sensitive to changes in the upper end of the income distribution. The second was
the wage share of the economy. While the Gini is a direct measure of the income
distribution, the connection between the wage share and the income distribution
is not as abvious. However, none of these variables had a significant eﬀect on
aggregate consumption. There are several possible reasons for why the income
distribution is insignificant, it could be that the variables do not pick up the real
developments in the income distribution, that the changes in the income distribu-
tion has not been large enough to aﬀect consumption or that income inequality
does not have the suggested eﬀect on consumption. Future research might be able
to shed more light on this relationship.
The second part of the analysis was to include diﬀerent wealth variables separately
in the model. In the long run I found that consumption is determined by the
following equation
c = 0.37y + 0.08wH + 0.27wF   0.64RR (9.1)
We see that housing wealth has a smaller eﬀect on consumption than financial
wealth and that the eﬀect of the real interest rate is negative. The small income
eﬀect and lack of homogeneity in income and wealth are potential weaknesses of
the model, but for forecasting up to three years ahead, which is the objective of
the KVARTS-model, this is not necessarily a problem.
In the short run analysis, two categories of financial wealth were included. The
first, and most liquid, consists of cash and bank deposits, the second, less liquid
category consists of stocks, bonds and other financial assets. The analysis show
that the latter category has the largest eﬀect on consumption, confirming the
assumption that cash and bank deposits are held more as a means of transactions
instead of as a store of wealth. I also find that housing wealth has a short run
eﬀect, but that this is small.
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When reducing the ECM model, debt does not “make the cut”. This suggests
that short term changes in debt do not aﬀect consumption. However, interest
payments on debt are included in the variable for disposable income, and debt is
also accounted for in the long run equation, where the wealth variables are net
wealth.
While the current consumption function in KVARTS needs to include a step-
dummy for the financial crisis, I end up with a new conditional consumption
function that forecasts well ex post, even without such a dummy. I find stable
coeﬃcients in the ECM model, but unstable coeﬃcients in the cointegration anal-
ysis.
Even if the estimated model performs better after the financial crisis, the changed
behavior of consumers is still a puzzle. The conclusion so far seems to be that
there are several eﬀects working at the same time. The increased uncertainty
during the financial crisis certainly played a role, the same for the pension system
which both increased the working populations incentive to save, as well as giving
certain age groups the possibility of working while still collecting their pension.
Also the increased immigration might have increased the aggregate savings rate.
Future research might be able to incorporate these factors in an empirical model,
but this thesis has shown that splitting wealth can at least take us a part of the
way.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data definitions and sources
Most of the data used in this thesis are collected from Statistics Norway’s KVARTS
database.
AGE Variable for the relative size of the population age between 50 and
66 years. The variable is constructed as P50-66 / (P20-49 + P67up).
Source: Statistics Norway.
C Consumption expenditure in households and ideal organizations less
expenditure on health services and housing. Nominal value deflated
by PCPEB. Source: Statistics Norway
CPI Consumer price index. Source: Statistics Norway.
CPSTOP Dummy-variable constructed to catch the price freeze in 1978. Its
value is 1 for the period from 1978(1) to 1980(1), zero elsewhere.
DEBT Total debt for households. Nominal value deflated by PC. Source:
Statistics Norway.
FINWEALTH1 The most liquid financial wealth, containing cash and bank de-
posits. Nominal value deflated by PC. Source: FINSE database, Norges
Bank.
FINWEALTH2 Less liquid financial wealth. This category contains stocks, bonds
and other financial wealth. Nominal value deflated by PC. Source:
FINSE database, Norges Bank.
FINWEALTH3 The least liquid category of financial wealth. This category con-
tains insurance claims. Nominal value deflated by PC. Source: FINSE
database, Norges Bank.
Gini Variable measuring the income distribution. Series from Aaberge (2007).
HOUSEWEALTH Nominal value of house wealth deflated by PC. Source: Statis-
tics Norway.
i Nominal interest rate. Average interest rate on households’ bank loans.
Source: Norges Bank.
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INF Inflation, constructed as the fourth diﬀerence of the log-transformed
CPI.
PC Price deflator for total consumption expenditure. Source: Statistics
Norway.
PCPEB Price deflator for consumption expenditure less spending on housing
services and health services.
RR Marginal after-tax real interest rate for households. Constructed as
RR = i ⇤ (1   ⌧)   INF . Zero for the period before 1984. Source:
Statistics Norway.
UNEMPL Norwegian unemployment. Labour force survey, seasonally-adjusted
figures. Source: Statistics Norway.
W Net total wealth. Nominal value deflated by PC. Defined as
Wt = (Lt 1   CRt 1 + (PH/PC)t ⇤Kt 1) (A.1)
Where Lt is household sector liquid assets, CRt is household sector
loans by banks and financial institutions, PHt is housing prices, PCt is
private consumption expenditure deflator, and Kt is the volume of the
residential housing stock. Source: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank.
This series was first introduced in Brodin and Nymoen (1992) and later
used in Jansen (2013).
Wage share Wage income as a share of total income. Constructed as wage/(wage+capital
income). Source: Statistics Norway.
Y Disposable income for households excluding equity income. Nominal
value deflated by PC. Source: Statistics Norway.
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A.2 Supplementary figures and tables
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Figure 20: Recursive estimated coeﬃcients of ECM from replication.
Table 12: General model of replication.
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Table 13: General model with separate wealth variables.
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Table 14: Replicated ECM-model estimated on new sample to make forecasts.
Table 15: Forecasts from ECM with separate wealth.
Table 16: Forecasts from replicated ECM.
A.3 General to specific modeling
Defined by Muellbauer and Lattimore (1995), the principle of general to specific
modeling, or GETS, is beginning with a general, congruent model and testing a
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series of simplifications to reduce it a parsimonious model that is consistent with
the data.
An important criticism of GETS has been that the model you end up with is de-
pendent on the “path” you choose to reduce the model, so called path-dependence.
This has been solved by building algorithms (see Hoover and Perez (1999)) that
automates the reduction process, examining multiple search paths and therefore
avoiding the path dependency issue. In the reduction process it is important to
only consider models passes diagnostic tests in order to retain congruence.
The basic steps of such an algorithm is; 1. Make sure that the general statistical
model is congruent by diagnostic testing. 2. Eliminate on or several variables that
satisfies the simplification criteria (e.g. significance of the variable). 3. Check if
the simplified model passes diagnostic tests. 4. Continue steps 2 and 3 until no
further simplification is possible (Campos et al., 2005).
Often we can find that searches lead to diﬀerent model selections, if we have several
competing models then we will use encompassing tests and information criteria to
choose the final model.
OxMetrics includes a GETS modeling tool named Autometrics, this what is used
in this thesis.
A.4 Information criteria
One of the diﬃcult choices that an econometrician must take when working with
time series, is to determine the number of lags to include in the model. A useful
method is to look at the so-called information criteria which aims to measure
the fit of the model relative to the number of parameters estimated. In the time
series setting one can always include many lags to achieve better fit and to get rid
of autocorrelation, but this also consumes degrees of freedom, and increases the
standard deviation.
The most known are the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz’s
Bayesian information criterion (SBIC and BIC). They are defined as:
AIC = −2ln(L)/T + 2N/T (A.2)
BIC = −2ln(L)/T +Nln(T )/T (A.3)
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Where T is the sample size, L is the maximized value of multivariate maximum
likelihood, and N is the total number of parameters in all equations in the VAR.
A lower information criteria indicates a better model. We can see that the BIC
gives more punishment for the number of parameters included in the model (N),
as long as
ln(T ) > 2! T > e2 ! T > 7.389 (A.4)
The sample size will for all my models be larger than 7.389 and the BIC will there-
fore often prefer fewer lags than AIC. It is also often the case that the information
criteria will leave us without a clear answer. According to Lütkepohl (2005), the
AIC will overestimate the lag order with a positive probability, while the BIC is
a consistent estimate of the true lag order.
A.5 Tests of stationarity
Here follows the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests that I have conducted on the data
series. I have used the sample period from the first quarter of 1986 until the latest
observation for each variable (this means 2015(4) for every variable except the
Gini, which has its last observation in 2014(1)), since this is the sample period for
my analysis in chapters 7 and 8.
c: ADF tests (T=120, Constant+Trend+Seasonals; 5%=-3.45 1%=-4.04)
D-lag t-adf betaY_1 sigma t-DY_lag t-prob AIC F-prob
4 -2.639 0.87998 0.02006 4.898 0.0000 -7.738
3 -1.995 0.90076 0.02204 -4.688 0.0000 -7.558 0.0000
2 -2.409 0.87050 0.02402 -4.131 0.0001 -7.394 0.0000
1 -3.278 0.81717 0.02567 -1.783 0.0773 -7.268 0.0000
0 -3.969* 0.78703 0.02591 -7.257 0.0000
Table 17: ADF test for consumption
dc: ADFtests (T=120, Constant+Seasonals; 5%=-2.891%=-3.49)
D-lag t-adf beta Y_1 sigma t-DY_lag t-prob AIC F-prob
4 -4.572** -0.30718 0.02024 -2.187 0.0308 -7.728
3 -5.762** -0.54699 0.02058 -4.599 0.0000 -7.702 0.0308
2 -12.85** -1.4740 0.02234 4.868 0.0000 -7.546 0.0000
1 -13.14** -0.74669 0.02446 4.745 0.0000 -7.372 0.0000
0 -14.07** -0.24798 0.02665 -7.209 0.0000
Table 18: ADF test for first diﬀerence of consumption
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y: ADFtests (T=120, Constant+Trend+Seasonals; 5%=-3.451%=-4.04)
D-lag t-adf beta Y_1 sigma t-DY_lag t-prob AIC F-prob
4 -2.103 0.86197 0.01301 1.269 0.2071 -8.604
3 -2.042 0.86580 0.01305 -7.441 0.0000 -8.607 0.2071
2 -2.723 0.78486 0.01590 -6.287 0.0000 -8.219 0.0000
1 -4.788** 0.59517 0.01841 -0.03630 0.9711 -7.933 0.0000
0 -5.389** 0.59380 0.01833 -7.950 0.0000
Table 19: ADF test for income
dy: ADFtests (T=120, Constant+Seasonals; 5%=-2.891%=-3.49)
D-lag t-adf beta Y_1 sigma t-DY_lag t-prob AIC F-prob
4 -5.648** -1.2616 0.01338 -0.9617 0.3383 -8.556
3 -7.685** -1.4880 0.01338 -1.686 0.0945 -8.564 0.3383
2 -17.09** -1.9513 0.01349 7.401 0.0000 -8.556 0.1569
1 -16.16** -0.89118 0.01636 7.647 0.0000 -8.177 0.0000
0 -13.16** -0.20166 0.02004 -7.780 0.0000
Table 20: ADF test for first diﬀerence of income
netwealth: ADFtests (T=120, Constant+Trend+Seasonals; 5%=-3.451%=-4.04)
D-lag t-adf beta Y_1 sigma t-DY_lag t-prob AIC F-prob
4 -2.549 0.95269 0.02425 1.520 0.1313 -7.359
3 -2.286 0.95812 0.02440 1.121 0.2647 -7.355 0.1313
2 -2.135 0.96132 0.02442 2.179 0.0314 -7.360 0.1715
1 -1.834 0.96652 0.02483 3.388 0.0010 -7.335 0.0434
0 -1.501 0.97146 0.02594 -7.255 0.0008
Table 21: ADF test for net total wealth
dnetwealth: ADFtests (T=120, Constant+Seasonals; 5%=-2.891%=-3.49)
D-lag t-adf beta Y_1 sigma t-DY_lag t-prob AIC F-prob
4 -3.978** 0.45392 0.02471 1.260 0.2103 -7.329
3 -3.763** 0.50735 0.02477 -1.038 0.3013 -7.332 0.2103
2 -4.462** 0.45707 0.02478 -0.7843 0.4345 -7.339 0.2671
1 -5.391** 0.41437 0.02474 -1.916 0.0579 -7.350 0.3537
0 -7.986** 0.29156 0.02503 -7.335 0.1457
Table 22: ADF test for first diﬀerence of net total wealth
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RR: ADFtests (T=120, Constant; 5%=-2.891%=-3.49)
D-lag t-adf beta Y_1 sigma t-DY_lag t-prob AIC F-prob
4 -1.917 0.89417 0.008687 -0.9029 0.3685 -9.443
3 -2.213 0.88175 0.008680 0.3641 0.7164 -9.453 0.3685
2 -2.200 0.88667 0.008647 -0.2010 0.8410 -9.468 0.6238
1 -2.345 0.88394 0.008612 -0.7581 0.4499 -9.485 0.8042
0 -2.670 0.87339 0.008596 -9.496 0.8168
Table 23: ADF test for the after-tax real interest rate
dRR: ADFtests (T=120, Constant; 5%=-2.891%=-3.49)
D-lag t-adf beta Y_1 sigma t-DY_lag t-prob AIC F-prob
4 -6.093** -0.52244 0.008792 0.9308 0.3539 -9.419
3 -6.593** -0.40001 0.008787 1.409 0.1616 -9.428 0.3539
2 -6.908** -0.23786 0.008824 0.1978 0.8435 -9.428 0.2449
1 -8.753** -0.21560 0.008788 0.7958 0.4277 -9.444 0.4130
0 -12.39** -0.13250 0.008774 -9.455 0.4782
Table 24: ADF test for first diﬀerence of the after-tax real interest rate
AGE: ADF tests (T=120, Constant; 5%=-3.45 1%=-4.04)
D-lag t-adf betaY_1 sigma t-DY_lag t-prob AIC F-prob
4 -3.290* 0.99773 0.000297 0.8690 0.3867 -16.20
3 -3.178* 0.99790 0.000297 1.120 0.2650 -16.21 0.3867
2 -2.977* 0.99812 0.000297 1.887 0.0617 -16.21 0.3698
1 -2.556 0.99842 0.000300 60.69 0.0000 -16.20 0.1411
0 0.883 1.0031 0.001703 -12.73 0.0000
Table 25: ADF test for AGE
dAGE: ADF tests (T=120, Constant; 5%=-3.45 1%=-4.04)
D-lag t-adf betaY_1 sigma t-DY_lag t-prob AIC F-prob
4 -1.908 0.96980 0.000298 3.124 0.0023 -16.19
3 -1.848 0.96965 0.000309 0.0764 0.9392 -16.12 0.0023
2 -1.857 0.96964 0.000308 -0.1941 0.8465 -16.14 0.0092
1 -1.864 0.96965 0.000307 -1.135 0.2586 -16.16 0.0239
0 -1.873 0.96946 0.000307 -16.16 0.0295
Table 26: ADF test for first diﬀerence of AGE
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adjGini: ADFtests (T=112,Constant; 5%=-2.891%=-3.49)
D-lag t-adf beta Y_1 sigma t-DY_lag t-prob AIC F-prob
4 -2.074 0.992690 .0002806 3.529 0.0006 -16.31
3 -1.790 0.993370 .0002952 3.186 0.0019 -16.21 0.0006
2 -1.731 0.993320 .0003075 -13.48 0.0000 -16.14 0.0000
1 -2.939* 0.981960 .0005014 19.18 0.0000 -15.17 0.0000
0 -2.114 0.97306 0.001044 -13.71 0.0000
Table 27: ADF test for adjusted Gini
dadjGini: ADFtests (T=112, Constant; 5%=-2.891%=-3.49)
D-lag t-adf beta Y_1 sigma t-DY_lag t-prob AIC F-prob
4 -2.374 0.911490 .0002792 -2.326 0.0219 -16.32
3 -3.114* 0.886540 .0002849 -3.369 0.0010 -16.28 0.0219
2 -4.726** 0.835830 .0002982 -3.161 0.0020 -16.20 0.0003
1 -8.073** 0.768850 .0003103 14.08 0.0000 -16.13 0.0000
0 -2.790 0.870840 .0005185 -15.11 0.0000
Table 28: ADF test for first diﬀerence of adjusted Gini
wageshare: ADFtests (T=120, Constant+Seasonals; 5%=-2.891%=-3.49)
D-lag t-adf beta Y_1 sigma t-DY_lag t-prob AIC F-prob
4 -1.867 0.83207 0.01693 -1.773 0.0790 -8.085
3 -2.216 0.80237 0.01709 -2.351 0.0205 -8.074 0.0790
2 -2.853 0.74905 0.01743 -2.862 0.0050 -8.042 0.0147
1 -3.928** 0.66447 0.01797 -2.517 0.0132 -7.989 0.0010
0 -5.657** 0.56353 0.01839 -7.952 0.0002
Table 29: ADF test for wage share
dwageshare: ADFtests (T=120, Constant+Seasonals; 5%=-2.891%=-3.49)
D-lag t-adf beta Y_1 sigma t-DY_lag t-prob AIC F-prob
4 -6.356** -1.5946 0.01713 -0.9226 0.3582 -8.062
3 -9.237** -1.8418 0.01712 2.135 0.0349 -8.071 0.3582
2 -10.77** -1.3767 0.01739 2.962 0.0037 -8.048 0.0715
1 -12.92** -0.87203 0.01797 3.935 0.0001 -7.989 0.0034
0 -16.35** -0.39824 0.01907 -7.879 0.0000
Table 30: ADF test for first diﬀerence of wage share
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finwealth1: ADFtests (T=120, Constant+Trend+Seasonals; 5%=-3.451%=-4.04)
D-lag t-adf beta Y_1 sigma t-DY_lag t-prob AIC F-prob
4 -1.398 0.97459 0.01545 6.428 0.0000 -8.260
3 -0.6389 0.98651 0.01804 -3.341 0.0011 -7.958 0.0000
2 -0.8499 0.98132 0.01884 -3.844 0.0002 -7.879 0.0000
1 -1.280 0.97044 0.01996 -1.577 0.1175 -7.772 0.0000
0 -1.504 0.96538 0.02009 -7.767 0.0000
Table 31: ADF test for financial wealth 1 (cash and bank deposits)
dfinwealth1: ADFtests (T=120, Constant+Seasonals; 5%=-2.891%=-3.49)
D-lag t-adf beta Y_1 sigma t-DY_lag t-prob AIC F-prob
4 -3.678** 0.17735 0.01584 0.01094 0.9913 -8.219
3 -3.905** 0.17815 0.01577 -7.127 0.0000 -8.235 0.9913
2 -9.714** -0.82482 0.01892 2.524 0.0130 -7.878 0.0000
1 -11.22** -0.47984 0.01937 3.517 0.0006 -7.840 0.0000
0 -12.36** -0.13290 0.02030 -7.754 0.0000
Table 32: ADF test for the first diﬀerence of financial wealth 1
finwealth2: ADFtests (T=120,Constant+Trend; 5%=-3.451%=-4.04)
D-lag t-adf beta Y_1 sigma t-DY_lag t-prob AIC F-prob
4 -3.587* 0.87815 0.03729 7.857 0.0000 -6.522
3 -1.772 0.92671 0.04616 -0.5841 0.5603 -6.102 0.0000
2 -1.919 0.92225 0.04603 -1.598 0.1127 -6.116 0.0000
1 -2.279 0.90901 0.04634 -0.2758 0.7832 -6.111 0.0000
0 -2.395 0.90676 0.04615 -6.127 0.0000
Table 33: ADF test for financial wealth 2 (stocks, bonds and other financial assets)
dfinwealth2: ADFtests (T=120, Constant; 5%=-2.891%=-3.49)
D-lag t-adf beta Y_1 sigma t-DY_lag t-prob AIC F-prob
4 -5.163** 0.10689 0.03699 3.756 0.0003 -6.545
3 -4.056** 0.28918 0.03904 -6.982 0.0000 -6.445 0.0003
2 -7.812** -0.37022 0.04639 0.9233 0.3578 -6.109 0.0000
1 -9.540** -0.26422 0.04636 2.019 0.0458 -6.118 0.0000
0 -11.69** -0.068205 0.04696 -6.100 0.0000
Table 34: ADF test for the first diﬀerence of financial wealth 2
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debt: ADFtests (T=120,Constant+Trend; 5%=-3.451%=-4.04)
D-lag t-adf beta Y_1 sigma t-DY_lag t-prob AIC F-prob
4 -3.173 0.97786 0.01076 9.834 0.0000 -9.007
3 -1.318 0.98766 0.01460 2.740 0.0071 -8.405 0.0000
2 -1.012 0.99031 0.01500 0.6632 0.5085 -8.358 0.0000
1 -0.9521 0.99095 0.01497 4.894 0.0000 -8.371 0.0000
0 -0.5377 0.99443 0.01637 -8.200 0.0000
Table 35: ADF test for debt
ddebt: ADFtests (T=120, Constant; 5%=-2.891%=-3.49)
D-lag t-adf beta Y_1 sigma t-DY_lag t-prob AIC F-prob
4 -2.448 0.79065 0.01109 1.775 0.0785 -8.955
3 -2.222 0.80973 0.01119 -9.135 0.0000 -8.944 0.0785
2 -4.097** 0.56439 0.01464 -2,642 0.0094 -8.415 0.0000
1 -5.766** 0.43828 0.01501 -0.6302 0.5298 -8.373 0.0000
0 -7.302** 0.40486 0.01497 -8.378 0.0000
Table 36: ADF test for the first diﬀerence of debt
housewealth: ADFtests (T=120,Constant+Trend; 5%=-3.451%=-4.04)
D-lag t-adf beta Y_1 sigma t-DY_lag t-prob AIC F-prob
4 -2.973 0.95356 0.02797 7.851 0.0000 -7.097
3 -1.552 0.97027 0.03462 1.269 0.2071 -6.678 0.0000
2 -1.417 0.97295 0.03471 -1.034 0.3032 -6.681 0.0000
1 -1.559 0.97047 0.03472 2.446 0.0159 -6.688 0.0000
0 -1.298 0.97501 0.03545 -6.654 0.0000
Table 37: ADF test for housing wealth
dhousewealth: ADFtests (T=120, Constant; 5%=-2.891%=-3.49)
D-lag t-adf beta Y_1 sigma t-DY_lag t-prob AIC F-prob
4 -3.387* 0.55913 0.02789 2.976 0.0036 -7.110
3 -2.703 0.64555 0.02882 -7.305 0.0000 -7.052 0.0036
2 -5.543** 0.21684 0.03473 -1.134 0.2593 -6.688 0.0000
1 -7.539** 0.12521 0.03477 1.187 0.2378 -6.693 0.0000
0 -8.717** 0.21173 0.03483 -6.698 0.0000
Table 38: ADF test for the first diﬀerence of housing wealth
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